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Foreword
My Area of Concentration is “Critical Perspectives on Energy Transition”.  Its primary focus is on
social, institutional, and economic barriers to a transition away from fossil fuels to mitigate climate
change.   Its  components  are  political  economy,  technical  aspects  of  sustainability,  and  alternative
economics.   This paper will  focus on reforms that can be made to the existing political  economic
system in order to move to a qualitatively different system that is sensitive to biophysical limits and
that is considerably more egalitarian and democratic than the present.  So far in the program I have
been learning about the structural barriers to sustainability and energy transition.  Now I would like to
carry this further into an analysis of the options and choices that may present themselves to people
searching for alternative political economic arrangements.  In this way, the paper progresses as my plan
of study progresses, from learning about the state of the world and the ways that it is determined by
political economic forces (among other things), to the concrete alternatives that exist to challenge the
existing inequality and unsustainable growth in resource throughput.  Thus, the paper will serve as a
fusion of my components, with an emphasis on what could be done.
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Abstract
This paper investigates the transition of societal institutions in light of the climate crisis.  It proceeds
from an understanding of  capitalism shaped by recent  literature  on  the  “metabolic  rift”,  primarily
drawing upon the work of Jason Moore.  From here, it considers the origins of the degrowth movement
and literature, which has been one of the more radical forces originating from an explicitly ecological
framework.  Degrowth is traced from its origins in the work of Georgescu-Roegen and the entropic
implications on the economic process, through the French revival of his ideas, and its reincorporation
into the academic literature.  Degrowth institutional reforms are summarized and it is provisionally
concluded that they represent a significant break with certain tenets of capitalist development, although
the way in which they are integrated is thought to be crucial.  However, the question of the role of the
market is raised in consideration of a break with capital accumulation.  This leads into the second major
part of the paper in which a debate on market socialism is revisited, in order to clarify how the market
can be theorized in the transition away from capitalism (and towards degrowth), as well as how the
economy can be democratized.  The debate reveals some of the essential differences between market
socialists and non-market socialists and enables the elaboration of their strategies for democratizing
economic life.  The debate is also contrasted with an understanding of markets in the development of
capitalism,  in  which  markets  came  to  mediate  two  elements  of  life  that  were  previously
uncommodified: land and labour.  In considering degrowth on the market debate, it is suggested that
markets  should  be  initially  socialized  and  democratized  (along  some  of  the  lines  exposed  in  the
elaboration of the debate) and then gradually reduced as the economy moves toward a more sustainable
basis.  This follows from the similar conclusion that degrowth and democratization must be integrated
parts  of  a  societal  transition.   The  paper  concludes  with  some  promising  avenues  of  political
mobilization which incorporate a spirit of systemic change in both an ecological and social direction.
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1. Introduction
"We all got to figure. There's some way to stop this. It's not like lightning or earthquakes. We've got a
bad thing made by men, and by God that's something we can change." - tenant, Grapes of Wrath
The  quote  above  from  John  Steinbeck’s  Grapes  of  Wrath makes  a  clean  distinction  between
lightning and earthquakes (natural forces), and the eviction of tenant farmers from their land during the
Great  Depression  (“a  bad  thing  made  by  men”).   Today  that  separation  is  hard  to  maintain;
anthropogenic  climate  change  is  now  making  storms  more  likely  and  the  practice  of  hydraulic
fracturing has been linked to increased earthquake activity.  But the general point remains the same:
there has got to  be a way to stop the “man-made” social  system that  is  simultaneously producing
intense  inequality  and  undermining  the  ecological  conditions  of  human  society  in  general  (not  to
mention for other species).  
The general focus of my research is on political  economic alternatives.   What are the structural
reforms that  can  be  made to  reduce  inequality,  enhance  democracy,  and reduce  the  throughput  of
resources?  This question is important at the present moment of human society because of the necessary
transition away from fossil fuels (both for reasons of climate change and because the reserves will run
out sooner or later).  This transition requires the transition of societal institutions that have evolved
alongside fossil fuel exploitation and contribute to its continuation.  Finding the political will or mass
mobilization necessary to implement these reforms is another related matter and one that I will touch
on only tangentially.  Within the context of the above question, I have separated the paper into two
sections: 1) degrowth, and 2) democratization.  This analytical separation reflects my thought around
societal  transition,  that  by necessity must proceed in  the direction of lowered energy and material
throughput, but also as a matter of desirability, could proceed in the direction of increased participation
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by people in  the management  of that  transition.   Although,  democracy may be a precondition for
lowering energy and material throughput.  By analyzing separately two movements that assume as their
starting point different objectives (i.e., one a lower footprint, the other democratic control) I hope to
reflect on how they both may sustain each other.  
Degrowth represents a diverse movement that pivots around, but is not restricted to, the need to
lower the material and energy throughput of society, at least for the Global North.  It arose out of the
limits-to-growth paradigm popularized by the Club of Rome and has been (and continues to be defined)
by a variety of authors from different intellectual traditions.  For this first part I will read a selection of
the available literature, some from contemporary sources that will give me a sense of how the term is
being currently used and also some that would be considered more foundational.  
Economic Democracy refers to the desire to ground control over society with the people that make
up that society, primarily through an extension of democracy into the economic realm.  While political
democracy (albeit limited) has been extended to all members of society (at least in the Global North),
the economy is seen as a separate sphere that operates under laws akin to natural ones.  I will read a
contemporary account of Economic Democracy as it could be applied, along with debates in the New
Left  Review  around  markets  and  planning.   The  outcome  will  be  to  contrast  a practical  market
socialism with its detractors, and then further, to consider the implications of degrowth on this debate.
1.1 Methodology
The  overarching  philosophies  that  shape  my  understanding  are  dialectical  materialism,  critical
realism, and radical realism.  Dialectical materialism1 is a Marxist-inspired philosophy on social and
natural change.  I will elaborate on six points, although this is not exhaustive.  First, it holds that there
1 This exposition of dialectical materialism draws heavily upon Foster et al. (2010, Chapters 11–12), Levins and 
Lewontin (1987), and Harvey (1997).  
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is an underlying material reality but that there are different levels of reality that “emerge” from lower
levels.  For example, the social (or cultural) is different from the biological which is different from the
chemical which is different from the physical in some qualitatively irreducible way.  This is not to
suggest  that  there  is  a  discrete  distinction  between these levels  but  rather  that  there are  emergent
properties of each that cannot be deduced from the underlying parts.  It also is important to note that
lower levels certainly constrain what is possible at higher levels.  A second related important corollary
of dialectical thought is that whole makes part and part makes whole.  In other words, it is impossible
to conceive of the parts (of a system) independent of the whole, but both must be seen as in a process of
mutual development.  Third, processes are irreversible and sometimes the conditions of the whole can
change in ways that allow for new possibilities or close off existing ones.  For example, the way that
early microbial life on Earth created the atmospheric conditions suitable for human life, or the way that
human society is currently changing that same atmosphere in ways that are potentially making Earth
uninhabitable for humans and other animal life.  Fourth, what has been inherited from the past often
constrains present possibilities.  For example, in the evolution of an organism not just any mutation is
viable but only those that are compatible with the inherited structure accumulated thus far.2  Finally,
while change is a constant process, its rate often varies and in fact there are often periods of relative
stability punctuated by periods of abrupt change that occur when certain tipping points or thresholds
are reached.  For example, it  has been suggested that the climate system is subject to such tipping
points.  
Critical realism maintains that although there is an underlying material reality, our understanding of
it  is  necessarily  sifted  through human  perception,  which  is  itself  affected  unavoidably by society
(Foster, Clark, & York, 2010, Chapter 14).  Thus, what we know, or think we know, about the world
2 It is often good to use caution when extrapolating from a natural example to social systems, however, this is a well 
accepted concept that historical conditions constrain the agency exhibited by present actors
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around us, is influenced by social factors.  This is not to suggest that all truth claims are completely
relative or equally valid, rather that what is studied, how it is studied, and the interpretations derived,
can be better understood by placing them within their historical and social context.  Further, although
we can say that  nothing is  completely objective the next  best  thing is  inter-subjective verification
(Eckersley, 2004, p. 123).  That is to say, that if something is overwhelmingly supported by a majority
of people it can become as fact.  This is one of the hallmarks of the scientific method. Theories are
never fully proven but they become accepted on the basis of repetitive experiments or how well they fit
with the larger whole of scientific knowledge.  
Radical realism  (Malleson, 2014, pp. xxii–xxiii) holds that utopian visions are important both for
inspiring people and providing something to work towards. Otherwise, the seeming determinism and
seeming inevitability of the present society may perpetuate existing social  relations.  Also,  a vision
provides a framework within which to create and evaluate possible reforms. On the other hand, radical
realism attempts to outline how the vision is achievable given the current state of society. It tries to
recognize alternative social arrangements that already exist within the current society (or that are not
too far-fetched), that could be nurtured and expanded to transform it. It also does not idealize different
social relations, but presents a balanced perspective in terms of what is being gained but also what is
being given up. In this way it avoids presenting an idyllic picture, recognizing that society will never
arrive at a “final destination”, but still is able to move along lines that most would accept as progress.
1.2 Method
For both sections I will identify, compare, and contrast key reforms in and between the literature to
make arguments about potential future transition paths. The method can be approximately divided into
four  parts:  1)  Read  a  representative  sample  of  the  field  (in  this  case  degrowth  and  economic
democracy), 2) Provide a historical context for the readings to better understand how the ideas have
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developed  over  time,  3)  Identify  strategies  for  societal  reform within  and  between  each  body of
literature 4) Analyze these strategies from an understanding of capitalism's development and from the
standpoint of revolutionary reforms, 5) Reflect on how these two lines of thought inter-relate or could
inter-relate.  
1.3 Capitalism: The Context
My research must  inevitably contend with the dominant  economic system, a  globally integrated
capitalism.  It is certainly a contention that a green capitalism or an eco-capitalism is not possible
(Sarkar,  1999;  Smith,  2015)  Although,  whether  it  is  not  possible  or whether  we just  have yet  to
implement the necessary restrictions and counter-balances is up for debate (see Victor, 2008).  Much of
it pins on semantics; whether capitalism must continually “grow”3 and whether a system that does not
grow could still be considered capitalism.  I am inclined to argue that a system that does not grow is not
capitalism4.  Nevertheless, capitalism is the departure point and thus must be understood in order to be
changed.  It is necessary to outline my understanding of capitalism so that I can analyze the strategies
advocated by the degrowth and economic democracy literature.
Capitalism can be identified by several characteristics.  First, by the private ownership of the means
of production (in relatively few hands) and the compulsion on the part of workers to sell their labour
for a wage.  Second, the capitalist retains ownership of the products of the production process and must
bring them for sale on the market to realize profit.  Third and lastly, production and consumption are
predominantly coordinated via a market mechanism according to supply and demand.  Note that these
features can be contested (on the grounds of what has been included and what may have been left out)
3 Typically measured by indicators such as GDP (money value of all final goods and services produced in a country), 
although an increase in GDP does not necessarily imply an increase in throughput of energy or raw materials.  
4 Since capitalism is characterized by the continuous accumulation of capital (money in pursuit of more money), if this 
process is interrupted then I think we would be compelled to find another word or modifier that could describe the 
resulting system
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since they represent generalizations of a historical process.  Thus, it is necessary to actually engage
with the history of capitalism’s historical  development  in order to come to a fuller  understanding;
although this history is also contested.
Capitalism is a system of economic organization that emerged out of the feudal system in England
(or at least Western Europe, depending on the interpretation) and subsequently spread unevenly around
the world.  This transformation has been detailed by Marx (1999 [1867]), Polanyi (2001 [1944]), Wood
(1995), Moore (2003), and Heller (2011) among others, and there is still some (much?) debate over the
determining  factors.   The  debate  typically  pins  around  the  exact  location,  timing,  and  crucial
determinant factors of the capitalist  transition.   For example,  Wood places the development  in the
English countryside and on the particular change in social relations that occurred there.  Heller, on the
other hand, sees capitalist  development as imminent in several western European countries but the
English state was the first to successfully reinforce these dynamics.  For Heller, the state has a more
prominent  position  and the  class  relations  within the English peasantry are  slightly different  from
Wood's account.  Similarly, Moore does not specify an exact location for the origins of capitalism but
prefers the use of “western Europe”, drawing attention rather to how this incipient capitalist transition
took place through the colonization and exploitation of the Americas, western Africa (slave trade), and
eastern Europe.  I will draw primarily upon Moore's account because I think he best theorizes nature
and society within the development of capitalism.  
Moore builds on Marx's value theory, Foster's  (2000) theory of the metabolic rift (which was also
derived from Marx), and Wallerstein's World Systems Theory.  The essence of this combination is that
capitalism must be understood not as a social system that causes environmental destruction but as a
world-ecological system (a way of organizing nature).  The “law of value” of capitalist production can
be understood as a “durable pattern of power and production that has obtained over the time and space
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of historical capitalism”  (Moore, 2015, p. 52).  This law of value refers to the historical transition
(beginning around 1450) “from land productivity to  labour productivity as a metric of wealth and
power” (Moore, 2015, p. 58). Central to the formation of the law of value was the colonial exploitation
of  commodity  frontiers.   Thus,  capitalist  development  has  been  dependent  on  a  dual  process:
concentration of wealth through the private ownership of the means of production, which both depends
on and facilitates continual appropriation of “Cheap Natures” (food, labour-power, energy, and raw
materials).  
The appropriation of nature on the periphery of capitalism's geographical centre depended on new
ways of standardizing, quantifying and mapping nature (the bundle of relations which Moore calls
“abstract social nature”) in service to increasing labour productivity.  This coincides with the scientific
revolution, new ways of conceptualizing nature (as external to humans), and even changes in the way
that space and time were understood.  “The systemic formation of value relations occurred through a
cascading series of small and large shifts in the Atlantic world after 1450.  These shifts transcended the
convenient boundaries of economy, culture, politics, and so forth; they favoured a reality and a practice
of  material  transformation  that  encouraged a  mathematized  and mechanical  world-praxis”  (Moore,
2015,  p.  214).   These  “value  relations”  are  the  systemic  counterpart  to  the  “substance”  of  value:
abstract social labour.  The new knowledge-practices of early capitalism were not independent of either
colonial expansion or private property but rather interacted with these things in a “virtuous” circle.
“The cascading processes that facilitated – but did not ensure – the triumph of capitalism emerged
sometimes  from commodification,  sometimes  from imperial  and state  machineries,  and sometimes
from new modes of knowledge production” (Moore, 2015, p. 216).5  
5 Commodification refers to the transformation of goods and services into ones that are produced for exchange on the 
market.
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This implies that the rise of capitalism actually began much earlier than many accounts based on the
primacy of the industrial revolution would attest.  
“The  rise  of  large-scale  industry,  co-produced  through  a  new  phase  of  appropriation
(centred  on  fossil  fuels),  was  unthinkable  in  the  absence  of  these  symbolic-material
revolutions  –  producing  abstract  time,  space,  money,  and  nature.   This  family  of
abstractions  was  central  to  the  revolutionary  transformation  of  the  Atlantic-centred
capitalist  world-ecology,  three  centuries  before  the  steam  engine  reached  maturity.”
(Moore, 2015, p. 209) 
Technological innovations (especially the ability to harness the energy in fossil fuels) were essential
to capitalist development, yet rather than fossil fuels being the spark of capitalist development it would
be more accurate to say that capitalism remade itself  through the exploitation of fossil fuels.  The
machinery  in  and  of  itself  cannot  be  understood  outside  of  capitalist  social  relations.   Indeed,
mechanical improvements such as steam power were not necessarily adopted because they represented
a cheaper or more powerful alternative to water wheels, but because they enabled greater control over
the production process and the emerging working class (Malm, 2013).  The upshot is that the history of
technological  development  cannot  be  separated  from the  private  ownership  of  production  and the
“need” (especially in the early days of the Industrial Revolution) to create a class of tractable and
disempowered workers who would not question the factory division of labour, the intensity of factory
work, or the need for capitalist control (Marglin, 1974).  
The market, in this context, can also be seen as a tool or technique for reorganizing nature.  The
state-driven  process  of  market  creation  goes  hand-in-hand  with  the  creation  of  particular  private
property  regimes6 and  a  class  of  “free”7 waged  labourers.   Thus,  markets  expanded  from  their
6 The ability to sell property.
7 Freed of the means of production and free to sell their labour for a wage.
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traditional role in facilitating luxury exchange, on the margins of the economic process, to encompass
the very land itself and the people who were slowly (or sometimes abruptly) dispossessed from it.  This
separation  of  people  from the  land,  facilitated  by market  reductionism8 and  colonial  practice,  has
systematized  the  conditions  under  which  nature  is  continually  transformed  and  its  benefits
concentrated.  This concentration takes place in particular geographical locations which have been able
to strategically transform nature, realize its benefits, and externalize some of the impacts onto distant
populations and future generations; all facilitated by flows of money and violence.  
What all of this affirms is that we cannot reduce capitalism to an “economic” system.  Indeed, even
beyond  these  technics  of  appropriation  and  production  Moore  references  what  have  been  called
“cultural  fixes”,  which can serve to naturalize “not only capital's  appropriation of unpaid work by
humans but also new epoch-making practices of appropriating unpaid work by extra-human natures”
(Moore, 2015, p. 198).  
Since capital is constantly running up against barriers to accumulation the history of capitalism has
been one of a series of ecological revolutions:
“An ecological  revolution  occurs  when the  innovations  of  capital,  science,  and empire
forge  a  new  unity  of  abstract  social  labour,  abstract  social  nature,  and  primitive
accumulation.  These unities are world-ecological regimes.  Technical and organizational
innovations  allow  for  rising  labour  productivity.   Ways  of  mapping,  quantifying,  and
discovering  new  historical  natures  –  and  new  use-values  –  allow  for  the  rising
appropriation of unpaid work/energy.  And the coercive-intensive processes of territorial
conquest and dispossession open new, largely uncommodified, natures to the penetration of
global value-relations.  This trinity – agro-industrial revolutions, scientific revolutions, and
“new” imperialisms – forms the core of capitalism's world-praxis. These three moments are
always uneven, but tend to converge during periods of systemic crisis. Their successful
8 The idea that everything is exchangeable at the right price.
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convergence restores the Four Cheaps [i.e., food, labour, energy, raw materials]”  (Moore,
2015, p. 150)
 
This  interpretation  of  ecological  revolutions  parallels  but  deepens  what  some  would  describe  as
technological  revolutions  that  dramatically  increase  the  productivity  of  labour.   They  emerge  in
response  to  major  crisis  (i.e.,  depression),  which  can  be  understood  generally  as  combinations  of
overproduction (i.e., too many goods produced), overaccumulation (i.e., too few productive outlets for
investment) and underproduction (i.e., a lack of effective demand due to a rise in the cost of production
inputs – e.g., raw materials) (Moore, 2015, pp. 91–92).  Essentially, it is incorrect to think of economic
crises that are not also ecological and ecological crises that are not also economic.  They are both crises
in the particular metabolism of human beings and the rest of nature.  
What implications does this understanding have for transitioning from capitalism?  For one thing, it
is  sometimes  recognized that  capitalism is  reaching the  limits  of  its  “Cheap Nature”  strategy and
therefore of continual accumulation  (see Meszaros, 2014; Moore, 2015; Wallerstein, 2007).   Moore
describes  the  neoliberal  era  as  a  “magisterial  final  act  of  redistribution  without  [a]  productivity
revolution”; the financialization of the economy is an instance of “taking first, and  making second”
(Moore, 2014, p. 39).  Nevertheless, even if capitalism is entering an era of permanent stagnation,
irreparable damage to the planet could occur (and is  occurring)  in  attempts  to restart  the cycle of
accumulation, and even though the limits to capitalism are both at the same time natural and social,
only human beings  can dismantle  it.   This understanding also suggests that  to  force capitalism to
internalize its externalities, to force capital to pay the costs of reproducing nature, is to end capitalism.
“To call for capital to pay its own way is to call for the abolition of capitalism” (Moore, 2015, p. 145).  
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1.4 Transition
The speed of transition often demarcates reform or revolution.  Although a series of reforms over a
period of time may look like a revolution when viewed on a longer time scale (Malleson, 2014).  The
transition from feudalism to capitalism took place over hundreds of years, yet some moments have
been  identified  as  more  formative  (revolutionary)  than  others.   This  transformation  may  provide
valuable  insight  into  future  societal  transitions,  although  really  the  context  is  totally  different.
Incremental  change  would  appear  to  offer  the  most  painless  and self-conscious  way to  transform
society, yet at the same time sustaining momentum for reforms over the long term has been historically
difficult.   The  incremental  advance  of  social  democracy  (associated  with  the  so-called  class
compromise  of  the  post-war  years)  was  met  with  the  neoliberal  counter  movement  of  the  1970s
(Harvey, 2007).  Unfortunately, historical revolutionary changes have also proven difficult to sustain
(as in the case of Russia or China) and have often brought much repression even if they also achieved
many worthwhile goals (equality, full employment).  Of course, any revolutionary project cannot be
analyzed in isolation from the capitalist system, nor capitalism in isolation from revolutionary projects9.
The historical failure of alternative projects to flourish is matched (and exceeded) only by the historical
failure of capitalism to provide adequate development for all and not undermine the conditions of life.
Thus, although the historical precedents are few the hope is that in such times of existential crisis for
both  capitalism  and  human  society  generally,  alternatives  will  be  seen  as  imperative.   As  the
contradictions of capitalism accumulate and crisis tendencies amplify, there may be more and more
disillusionment with the status quo, which could translate into viable movements for reform.  
It might be worthwhile to suggest that while actual physical changes will have to proceed slowly due
to the nature of the accumulated infrastructure (which cannot be simply replaced in a day), changes in
9 The existence of the Soviet Union had an impact on how capitalism functioned after World War II, allowing greater 
concessions in the era of social democracy (1940s to the 1970s).  
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power structures,  forms of ownership,  or collective ideologies  could occur  more quickly (e.g.,  the
election of a new government).  While getting rid of capitalism requires change on all fronts to effect a
complete  shift  to  a  different  mode  of  production  and  consumption,  the  actual  physical  transition
process  of  built  environments  and technological  infrastructure  should  probably proceed within  the
context of a long-term plan.  This accords with Peter Victor's modelling of an economic steady-state in
which a gradual levelling off (over many years) of material production results in favourable outcomes,
whereas a dramatic end to growth would be painful (Boyd, 2015, p. 271).  Eckersley also notes that an
ecological tax regime is likely to have inflationary consequences unless carefully phased and managed
(Eckersley, 2004, p. 64)
In this research I will focus on institutional reforms that will be analyzed for their ability to act as
non-reformist reforms or revolutionary reforms (Andre Gorz, 1968), which are those that challenge the
underlying logic and structure of the capitalist system.  In this way, I seek a middle path between
reform and revolution, recognizing that many of the reforms proposed will likely require revolutionary
action to carry them out.  
Why the institutional reforms?  Why not just change capitalism from the bottom up?  I agree with
Kallis (a degrowth author) who wrote, in response to those who would rather pursue voluntary action:
“I  can’t  see,  however,  how  this  can  happen  without  occupying  also  the  state,  with  a  mutual
reinforcement of civil and political society, grassroots practices and new institutions”  (Kallis, 2015).
Given the global nature of the environmental challenge any change that is to have enough of an impact
must be institutionalized at the level of the state (or at least a semi-autonomous regional government) if
not internationally.  It is equally clear that states have played an integral role in the development of
capitalism, whether during the transition from feudalism  (Heller,  2011, p. 7) or in the 20th  century
(Panitch & Gindin, 2013).  However, if states are capable of creating and sustaining capitalism they are
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also  capable  of  unmaking it  (in  practice  it  probably depends  on  which  states),  although this  will
probably require a political movement and organization that is capable of garnering the needed support
or pressure to do this.  The question that I seek to answer, or at least shed light on, is what reforms
could be offered at the level of a regional or national government in order to move beyond capitalism?
2. Part 1: Degrowth
For the first part of the paper I have chosen to review the literature on the “degrowth” movement that
has emerged in recent  years.   The reason for choosing degrowth,  as mentioned above,  is  that  this
movement  takes  seriously the  need  to  lower  the  energy and  material  throughput  of  industrialized
societies.  I will provide an overview of degrowth, outline the institutional reforms for transition found
within the degrowth literature, and then consider how these reforms challenge capitalism.  To lead into
the second part of the paper I will consider the treatment of economic democracy and the market within
the degrowth literature.  
2.1 Overview of Degrowth
Degrowth is a broad term that encompasses many intellectual currents. One of its most fundamental
ideas is the recognition of ecological limits to economic growth.  To this can be added a critique of
development, productivism, and the “economic” as a category in and of itself.  Within the history of
degrowth as a concept, it was the ecological limits critique that was adopted first.
In the early 1970s there were a slew of writings on resource limits including Nicholas Georgescu-
Roegen's 1971 paper The Entropy Law and the Economic Process, the January 1972 journal collection
A Blueprint for Survival, the May 1972 report Limits to Growth commissioned by the Club of Rome10,
and E.F. Schumacher's 1973 book Small is Beautiful.  While all of these references could conceivably
be degrowth precursors (and Schumacher is usually included) it is Georgescu-Roegen (G-R) who is
10 A global think tank that deals with international political issues
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usually cited due to the nature of his economic analysis and his influence on French activists who went
on to popularize and transform the term.  
André Gorz was the first one to use the term degrowth (actually décroissance in French) but he does
so in a passage of his  Ecology as Politics (1975) that references G-R.  Romanian mathematician and
economist  (who  studied  under  Schumpeter),  it  was  G-R  who  investigated  the  implications  of
thermodynamics on the economic process and revealed that regardless of how many fossil fuel reserves
were left, their combustion entailed an irreversible process that could not be sustained.  Further, the
reserves of inorganic raw materials (e.g., metals, minerals) is also finite and subject to deterioration
over the long term (Georgescu-Roegen, 2011b [1971]).  G-R made the mistake of trying to install this
latter point about inorganic raw materials as a fourth law of thermodynamics, which turned out to be
incorrect  and  undermined  its  (and  indeed  G-R's)  credibility  somewhat.   Nevertheless,  despite  its
theoretical  thermodynamic shortcomings,  it  still  has relevance for  the economic process  (Bonaiuti,
2011, p. 37).  Essentially, it suggests that recycling of materials can never be 100% effective due to
losses during use of the material and losses in the recycling process itself.  For example, theoretically
every molecule of metal could be recovered and recycled but practically this would not be possible due
to the tremendous amount of energy and time needed to accomplish this.  Thus, to the greatest extent
possible,  the economy should rely on derivatives of solar11 and geothermal energy, and on organic
materials (plants, animals, bacteria, etc.) that reproduce themselves within reasonable time frames.  
Perhaps it is no surprise (given the uncomfortable implications of G-R's critique) that G-R's ideas
were largely ignored by mainstream economists.  It was almost 20 years later before they were picked
up again in the North American academic literature in 198912, within the emerging field of ecological
11 Although fossil fuels are a derivative of solar energy they do not recreate themselves on a time frame that is useful for 
humans, therefore the derivatives referred to here are those that are influenced by the current flow of solar radiation, 
namely wind, water, and biomass.
12 Although within France G-R's ideas were kept alive by Gorz and Grinevald 
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economics (Bonaiuti, 2011, pp. 28–29). However, his ideas, especially those on the recycling of matter,
were debated once in the journal of Ecological Economics (edited by Robert Costanza and co-edited by
Herman Daly) and then never again (Bonaiuti, 2011, p. 44).  The purpose of this debate seemed mostly
to call into question the “Fourth Law” and its attendant uncomfortable economic consequences.  The
result was to entrench the concept of the steady state economy (which was developed by Daly and
criticized by G-R) within ecological economics and accept in principle the paradigm of sustainable
development (which was famously articulated in the Brundtland Report of 1987).  
The steady-state economy has a “constant population and constant stock of capital, maintained by a
low rate  of  throughput  that  is  within the regenerative and assimilative capacity of the ecosystem”
(Bonaiuti, 2011, p. 44).  For G-R this is unachievable in the long run due to the inevitable deterioration
of fossil fuels and inorganic raw materials. The important thing for Daly, it seems, was presenting a
model  of  a  relatively sustainable  society,  as  compared  with  the  growth-oriented  development  of
contemporary society that is disrupting life-sustaining processes in the here and now, let  alone the
distant  future.   For  G-R  this  seemed  dishonest  in  its  presentation,  since  a  steady-state  implies
sustainability  in  the  long term.   Relatedly,  G-R also  objected  to  the  steady-state  economy on the
grounds  that  it  was  a  developmental  impossibility.   The  reality  of  constant  change  (i.e.,  the
irreversibility and evolutionary nature of the economic process) resists any permanent stability of the
kind that a steady-state seems to suggest.  He also said, a bit disingenuously13, that the full application
of the steady-state model would condemn poor countries to their present state of development.  Today it
is often acknowledged, and argued especially by Kerschner  (2010),  that degrowth and a steady-state
economy are complementary ideas, and that some degrowth is required before a steady-state can be
implemented.  Also, that while a steady-state aims for certain levels of energy and material throughput,
13 It would seem obvious that Daly's model was intended for developed countries.
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these would necessarily oscillate around the desired levels since it is impossible to exhibit absolute
control at all times (Kerschner, 2010, p. 548).  
Sustainable development was defined by the Brundtland Report14 as that which “meets the needs of
the present without comprising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (Brundtland
& others, 1987, p. 16).  In the almost 30 years since this was written down, the colossal failure of this
rhetoric to make any difference has been striking (indeed, half of the carbon dioxide emissions added to
the atmosphere since the Industrial Revolution have occurred in the last 30 years (Heede, 2013)15).  I
imagine Daly does not approve of the way that sustainable development was co-opted and turned into a
project of ecological modernization16.  However, he was comfortable with the language itself, arguing
that only sustainable growth should be considered an oxymoron.  Development on the other hand does
not require quantitative increases in consumption but is rather a qualitative change that can occur under
different levels of material throughput.  While this is useful in the sense of clearly defining terms,
according to Bonaiuti it reveals some “pre-analytical” differences between G-R and Daly.  For G-R,
growth and development are intertwined historical processes and cannot be considered separately, even
in constructing an ideal case.  As G-R said, “who could think that development does not imply some
growth”.  Bonaiuti argues that this attempt to separate growth and development on Daly's part has led
to a focus on stopping growth through external controls, rather than confronting the real causes of
growth internal to the economic system.  In other words, ecological economists are more prone to argue
that it is “best to let existing institutions (i.e., transnational corporations and global markets) deal with
14 The final report of the United Nations' World Commission on Environment and Development headed by Gro Harlem 
Brundtland, then Prime Minister of Norway 
15 Part of the “Great Acceleration” in ecological impact that began around 1950 (Steffen, Broadgate, Deutsch, Gaffney, & 
Ludwig, 2015)
16 Ecological modernization refers to the competitive strategy pursued by states through increasing the stringency of 
environmental regulations (Eckersley, 2004, p. 69).  Although there is a range of practices and understandings of 
ecological modernization, the usage I employ here refers largely to the “technical case” (Eckersley, 2004, p. 74) which 
is concerned with technological adjustments at the level of the firm.  It does not challenge existing institutions or 
dominant neoliberal economic policies.
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the efficient production of wealth in order to intervene at a later stage in its distribution and impose
ecological limits” (Bonaiuti, 2011, p. 47).  This is a part of G-R's critique of sustainable development
and the reason why policies of sustainable development have not been effective over the last 30 years.
This  is  also  why  “reflections  on  degrowth  have  been  preferred  to  go  back  directly  to  G-R's
bioeconomics rather than to ecological economics” (Bonaiuti, 2011, p. 48).  
In 1993 and again in 2002, a Lyon-based magazine, Silence, published articles on Georgescu-Roegen
and his ideas.  The editors of the 2002 edition of the magazine, Bruno Clémentin and Vincent Cheynet,
had earlier  in 2001 copyrighted the term “sustainable degrowth” and “playfully warned against its
future  misuse and conventionalization”  (D’Alisa,  Demaria,  & Kallis,  2014,  p.  2).   The  favourable
reception of the 2002 edition, which sold 5,000 copies, was probably the starting point of the degrowth
movement (D’Alisa et al., 2014, p. 2).  The degrowth movement of activists began in Lyon (around car-
free  cities,  communal  meals  in  the  streets,  food cooperatives,  and campaigns  against  advertising),
spread  to  Italy  and  Spain  as  part  of  anti-globalization  activist  movements,  was  popularized  in
magazines and through the first conferences organized on the topic, and eventually globalized through
a network of researchers.  This second phase of degrowth (from the early 2000s) was oriented around a
critique of the hegemonic concept of sustainable development (D’Alisa et al., 2014, pp. 2–3).  Since it
originated in France it has some particularly French attributes.
First, there is a French intellectual history that revolves around a criticism of modernity.  This can be
found in the writing of Jacques Ellul and Bernard Charbonneau.  Charbonneau anticipates some of the
arguments of Schumacher's  Small is Beautiful (1973) in his 1969 work criticizing the “gigantism” of
cities, factories, and capital accumulation (Martínez-Alier, Pascual, Vivien, & Zaccai, 2010, p. 1742).
Ellul criticized the “technique” of modern society and inspired thinkers such as Ivan Illich, who would
in turn inspire Gorz.  Illich, although not from France, is perhaps the pre-eminent writer and inspiration
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for this “cultural” aspect of degrowth.  His essential point is that human institutions can reach such a
scale, preponderance, and centralization that they begin to undermine the goals that they set out to
achieve.  He was particularly critical of the school system and the medical system, but his analysis
extended to technology in general (Illich, 2001 [1973]).  He called for “convivial” tools that allow for
user understanding and control, as opposed to machines which tend to subordinate the user.  
This thinking overlaps with the post-development school of thought and the work of Serge Latouche,
who is considered the main French intellectual on degrowth.  “The essence [...] [of post-development]
is  the  critique  of  the  uniformisation  of  cultures  due  to  the  widespread  adoption  of  particular
technologies  and consumption  and production  models  experienced in  the  global  North”  (Demaria,
Schneider, Sekulova, & Martinez-Alier, 2013, p. 196).  For Latouche, degrowth is a merging of the two
intellectual traditions of political ecology (with its attendant critique of productivism17; see Gorz and
Grinevald)  and  criticisms  of  the  concept  of  development  (Martínez-Alier  et  al.,  2010,  p.  1742).
Martinez-Alier  et  al.  (2010)  suggest  that,  in  line  with  post-development  thinking,  degrowth  is
concerned  with  “establishing  other  social  ideals  rather  than  calling  for  development  as  such”
(Martínez-Alier et al., 2010, p. 1743).  It is concerned with re-examining the dominant economic values
of affluent societies and what it means to enjoy “the good life”.  For Latouche, as well, degrowth is
about challenging the dominant ideology of economic growth and economic calculation (repoliticizing
the  economic).   Thus  within  the  degrowth  concept  there  is  the  idea  of  not  just  producing  and
consuming less but changing the whole foundation of dominant economic thinking.  These specifically
French attributes of degrowth history served to further separate degrowth from steady-state theorists
who  did  not  recommend  such  a  radical  break  with  development  or  mainstream  economics.
Nevertheless, there may be some convergence happening as the degrowth concept spreads outside of
17 Productivism is the idea that more production is necessarily good.
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Europe.  
The internationalization of degrowth has signalled a growing popularity for the concept,  at  least
among academics.  One could say that degrowth aspires to represent an alternative paradigm to that of
sustainable  development,  ecological  modernization,  and  mainstream  economics.   Building  on  its
history, contemporary authors have sought to clarify and broaden the term.  Schneider et al.  (2010)
identified  five  sources  of  degrowth  thought:  1)  post-development,  2)  democracy,  3)  ecology,  4)
meaning of life, and 5) bioeconomics18/ ecological economics.  Demaria et al. (2013), building on the
work of Flipo (2007), have identified the same five sources and add one more: justice.  These two
papers show a significant overlap in degrowth sources but they also have two authors in common.
D'Alisa et al. (2014) suggest that degrowth has eight contributory “lines of thought”, which overlap
with the just mentioned sources: 1) anti-utilitarianism, 2) bioeconomics, 3) critiques of development, 4)
environmental justice, 5) currents of environmentalism, 6) societal metabolism19, 7) political ecology,
and 8) steady state economics20.  It is clear that these intellectual roots are not brought together without
tension, yet together they represent a relatively coherent ideological challenge (if not yet an actual
challenge) to the system of global capitalism.  Even the very idea of producing and consuming less is
incompatible with capitalism, except under conditions of recession.  
To present an actual challenge to capitalism degrowth ideas will have to be put into practice.  The
strategies for action can take many forms including opposition (e.g., to development or infrastructure
projects),  building  alternatives  (supporting  or  creating  projects/practices  that  are  thought  to  be
compatible  with  degrowth),  reformism (working  within  existing  institutions  to  change  them),  and
research  (Demaria  et  al.,  2013,  pp.  201–204).   There  is  also  a  recognition  within  the  degrowth
18 G-R's brand of economics
19 A school of thought that is concerned with understanding the flows of material and energy that sustain society.
20 Conspicuously absent is democracy.
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movement that it is important to be active at different spatial scales including the local, national, and
global  (Demaria  et  al.,  2013,  pp.  204–205).   The  different  strategies  can  create  tension  between
degrowth proponents, as can the ultimate vision of society that people subscribe to.  For example, will
there be a centralized state in a future degrowth society?  Or, how will democracy be institutionalized?
I have already outlined why I am focusing on institutional reforms primarily at the level of a national
government.  
2.2 Degrowth Proposals for Transition
G-R offered his thoughts for a minimal bioeconomic program in 1972.  He outlined eight points,
including, 1) the prohibition of all weapons manufacturing, 2) the development of the underdeveloped
nations (to a good, not luxurious,  life), 3) the lowering of world population to a level that can be
adequately  fed  by  organic  agriculture,  4)  the  avoidance  of  energy  wastage,  5)  the  curbing  of
consumption of extravagant gadgetry (e.g., golf carts and two-car garages), 6) the production of durable
goods and a rejection of fashionable obsolescence, 7) the design of products for repairability, and 8) the
avoidance of the infinite regress of technological development (e.g., shaving oneself faster so as to
have more time to work on a machine that shaves faster so as to have more time to work on a machine
that shaves still faster, and so on) (Bonaiuti, 2011, pp. 90–91).  The strength of G-R's proposal is that it
is firmly grounded in the biophysical dimension of the problem.  However, it does not investigate how
the reforms can be implemented from within existing institutions of private property, wage-labour, or
markets.  However, his point about weapons manufacturing is well taken.
While  G-R’s  bioeconomic  program is  a  guidepost  for  other  degrowth  proposals,  contemporary
writers have sought to think through the social changes that might accompany the technical changes
that G-R proposes.  This social dimension is characteristic of degrowth's evolution from an ecological
limits framework to one that focuses on how to actually enact such a degrowth transition from within
20
the confines of the existing system.  The reforms that could be implemented or at least supported at the
level of the state are summarized below.  Most of these have been found within journal articles and
books published in the last eight years, although I will occasionally reference degrowth precursors
when their ideas seem relevant or reinforce the contemporary literature.
Degrowth ideas for transition include collective ownership (worker cooperatives, community land
trusts,  credit  unions,  etc.)  (Johanisova,  Crabtree,  & Fraňková,  2013;  Johanisova,  Padilla,  & Parry
Philippa, 2014; Kallis, Kerschner, & Martinez-Alier, 2012, p. 175; Schumacher, 1989, pp. 250, 258);
job guarantee (Alcott, 2013; Unti, 2014) and basic income (Alexander, 2012, p. 16, 2014; Kallis et al.,
2012, p. 175); reduced working hours, work sharing, and reduced labour productivity (André Gorz,
1980, p. 41; Jackson, 2014; Kallis et al., 2012, p. 175; Schor, 2014);  maximum income (Alexander,
2012, p. 16, 2014; Kallis et al., 2012, p. 175) and reduction of private inheritance/bequest (Alexander,
2012, p. 17); alternative/intermediate/convivial technology (Domènech, March, & Saurí, 2013; André
Gorz, 1980, p. 41; Schumacher, 1989, p. 138) and renewable energy (Alexander, 2012, p. 17); resource
and energy caps/taxes (Kallis et al., 2012, p. 175) and population control (Martinez-Alier, 2014); public
money (Mellor, 2014) and debt audits (Cutillas, Llistar, & Tarafa, 2014); limitations on private property
(Kallis et al., 2012, p. 175); and new indicators of macro-economic progress (Alexander, 2012, p. 17). 
2.2.1 Collective Ownership
For degrowth,  the  scale  of  the  production process  should determine the structure  of  ownership.
Schumacher  articulated  this  in  1973:  “It  is  immediately  apparent  that  in  this  matter  of  private
ownership the question of scale is decisive.  When we move from small-scale to medium-scale, the
connection  between  ownership  and  work  already  becomes  attenuated;  private  enterprise  tends  to
become impersonal and also a significant social factor in the locality; it may even assume more than
local significance.  The very idea of private property becomes increasingly misleading” (Schumacher,
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1989, p. 248, emphasis in original).  In other words, what was private becomes increasingly a matter of
collective importance as the scale and scope of an operation increases.  It is worth noting that property
is not a thing but rather a social relation between the person or group who “owns” something and the
rest of society who respects certain rights of ownership (often through the enforcement of the state or
other governing body); “all property rights flow from the collective” (Bromley, 1991, p. 5, emphasis in
original).
According to Johanisova et al. (2014), there are three reasons why co-operative ownership structures
are more appropriate for a degrowth transition than typical joint-stock firms: 1) share ownership rules,
2) democratic governance structure, and 3) freedom from the legal obligation to maximize return to
shareholders.   On  the  first  point,  shares  in  a  cooperative  are  usually  non-transferable  and  only
redeemable at their original value.  This prevents speculation and a growth for growth's sake outlook
since  share  values  do not  increase  with  the  growth of  the  firm  (Johanisova et  al.,  2014,  p.  153).
Additionally,  the  growth  incentive  is  reduced  in  another  sense,  since  “doubling  the  size  of  the
enterprise may double the net profit, but it will also double the number of workers who must share that
profit”  (Schweickart, 1996, p. 96)21.  In contrast, a private owner (or owners) can realize double the
profit by doubling operations without any dilution of the profit amongst more people.  
Regarding the second point (on democratic governance), it is argued that a cooperative firm, at its
best,  collapses  the  distinctions  between  owner,  shareholder,  worker,  and  consumer,  and  operates
according to a “mutual-aid needs-satisfying logic” (Johanisova et al., 2014, p. 153).  The third point (no
legal requirement to maximize profit) is important so that other considerations, such as employment
and environmental protections, can be prioritized.
21 Schweickart is not a degrowth author (in fact we will see him in the second part of the paper) but I thought this point 
was well suited for this section.
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Johanisova et  al.  (2014) recognize  that  co-operatives  can  be  characterized  by a  loss  of  the  co-
operative  ethos  derived  from  the  seven  co-operative  principles  defined  by  the  International  Co-
operative Alliance (ICA)22.  This can happen for a number of reasons, including their integration in a
competitive  capitalist  market,  stratification  between  members  and  managers,  or  lack  of  access  to
sufficient credit from their members.  To prevent this from happening there should be a strong focus on
education within the co-operative, explicit policies to strengthen member participation in management,
the creation of links between co-operatives that bypass the mainstream economy, and the pursuit of a
strategy of replication (i.e., many small co-operatives rather than one big one).  In an earlier article
Johanisova et al.  (2013, p. 13) noted that collective ownership need not be reserved exclusively for
businesses but can extend to collective ownership of land (as exemplified by community land trusts)
and finance (credit unions).
While  the  state  can  nationalize  certain  large-scale  industries  (and  implement  some  kind  of
democratic worker self-management), for smaller firms it is more likely that the state create conditions
in which co-operatives are supported and encouraged.  For example, workers could have the legal right
to buy out their employer after the company achieves a certain size or after a certain period of time has
passed.  The education system could encourage co-operative businesses and it could be made easier for
co-operatives to access needed credit.   Government contracts could be preferentially offered to co-
operative firms.  
2.2.2 Job Guarantee and Basic Income
The job  guarantee  requires  that  the  government  provide  employment  to  anyone who is  seeking
employment (acting as an employer of last resort). This reform does not actually seek to degrow the
economy per se, but rather would serve as a check against the capitalist tendency to create involuntary
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unemployment during periods of slow or negative growth.  Also, since degrowth requires eliminating
jobs  in  many sectors (such as the fossil  fuel  sector)  the job guarantee could serve as  a  means of
cushioning and retraining those likely to lose their jobs  (Alcott, 2013, p. 57).  It also recognizes the
importance of  employment  to  people's  well-being,  as  opposed to  welfare,  which  does  not  provide
socially  meaningful  work.   The two major  objections  to  a  job  guarantee  are  around inflation  and
affordability  (Unti,  2014).  However, it  is argued that the job guarantee can actually help stabilize
prices through the buffer stock of workers employed in the program which would take pressure off of
conventional labour markets.  Second, in the US it is estimated to only cost 1% of the GDP, with many
of  the  costs  being  offset  by  reductions  in  spending  on  other  welfare  programs.   The  actual
implementation of the job guarantee could be accomplished by setting national level wage and benefit
packages but allowing for a decentralized administration through local governments, non-profits, and
community  organizations  (Unti,  2014).   Finally,  the  jobs  provided  could  be  channelled  towards
environmentally sustainable projects  and methods of production that will  not be undertaken by the
private sector.  The jobs could even serve to broaden our conception of work by including things like
raising children, caring for the elderly and infirm, education, habitat restoration, community gardening,
the arts, etc (Unti, 2014).23  Alcott (2013, p. 59) notes that there is an ongoing debate in the literature
around the desirability and feasibility of a job guarantee.
The basic  income is  usually  recommended for  everyone (not  just  those  who earn  less  than  the
minimum), regardless of employment status, although it could be tied to performing some community
service outside of the formal economy (Alexander, 2014).  With this latter responsibility it would be
closer  to  a  job  guarantee.   Like  the  job  guarantee,  there  are  two  standard  objections  to  its
23 The devaluation of the work of social reproduction and care has been a consistent criticism of capitalism on the part of 
feminist socialists.  Although I didn't emphasize this point in the section on capitalism, Moore explicitly incorporates 
this critique into his theorization by claiming that women's work is another form of “unpaid” work that is appropriated 
in service to accumulation.  
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implementation which are that  it  will  give rise  to  a society of free-loaders  and that  it  will  be too
expensive.  As for the first, it may be true that there will be some free-loading but generally human
beings are “social creatures who find being engaged in their community's work more meaningful and
fulfulling  than  being  isolated,  idle,  and  parasitic  on  their  community”  (Alexander,  2014,  p.  147).
Regarding affordability, the basic income could be phased in over time or started as a negative income
tax for those who make less than the minimum amount (Alexander, 2014).  Obviously the basic income
must be financed out of tax revenues, however the basic income would allow for the elimination of
other conflicting welfare programs that are also tax-financed.  
2.2.3 Reduced work hours, work sharing, and lower labour productivity
Reduced hours of work and work sharing are complementary measures of both decreasing overall
production and decreasing unemployment.  Economic growth is equal to the average level of labour
productivity  multiplied  by  the  average  work  time  multiplied  by  the  number  of  employed  people
(Jackson & Victor, 2011).  Therefore, in an intentionally shrinking economy, work time must fall if
there are no corresponding decreases in labour productivity or overall level of employed people. In
fact, many European countries already practice work sharing in times of economic recession  (Schor,
2014).   Essentially,  work  sharing,  a  basic  income,  and a  job guarantee  are  all  different  strategies
attempting to maintain economic security in an economy that is shrinking.  Work sharing is the only
one of these strategies that could lead directly to a decrease in economic growth, since if work time
reductions are not offset by increased employment levels or productivity increases then the economy
will shrink.  Although, if a basic income or a job guarantee leads to a structural shift to lower labour
productivity (for example, if  more people are engaged in “unproductive” work) then these policies
could also result in a shrinking of the economy.
On that note, the “new economy” (see Jackson, 2014) is about shifting the economy towards a lower
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level of labour productivity through the expansion of those activities that require little materials and
energy and are correspondingly labour intensive (but also enjoyable and serve to strengthen community
ties).  Jackson puts much emphasis on the service sector as an area that could be expanded.  Following
the formula identified above, this would lead to lower economic growth provided that work time and
the level of employed people did not increase to counteract it.  The idea of the new economy has some
relationship with Schumacher's  (and Gorz's)  idea that  society extend the amount  of  time spent  on
“actually  productive”  activity  in  order  to  give  everyone  the  “opportunity  of  working  usefully,
creatively, with his own hands and brains, in his own time, at his own pace – and with excellent tools”
(Schumacher, 1989, p. 144).  
2.2.4 Maximum Income and Inheritance Taxes
A maximum income simply designates a level over which any income would be taxed at a rate of
100%.  The reason for this policy is so that society does not become stratified between those who earn
a basic income and the super-rich (Alexander, 2014).  It also serves to recognize the negative effects
that  inequality can  have on society,  as  identified  by some social  science  research  (e.g.,  Pickett  &
Wilkinson, 2010).  
Inheritance taxes are a policy that aims to reduce the accumulation of wealth across generations by
limiting the amount of money and property that can be passed on to descendants.  The wealth seized
could be used to fund other things such as a basic income or renewable energy technology.  Alexander
suggests that “upon death a citizen's property would revert to the state rather than being passed down
from generation to generation” (2012, pp. 17–18).  
2.2.5 Technology
All of the points in G-R's bioeconomic program deal with technology, either directly or indirectly.
For G-R, the powerful mastery of technology was a distinguishing feature of human beings and a
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crucial component of his bioeconomics24.  Other degrowth precursors such as Illich and Schumacher
have called for what they have respectively called convivial tools or intermediate technology.  For
Illich, this means “modern tools that are used by everyone in an integrated and shared manner, without
reliance on a body of specialists who control said instruments”  (Deriu, 2014, p. 79).  Interestingly,
Illich  does  not  emphasize  the  ecological  dimension  of  technology  but  the  social.   It  is  not  that
technology is based on unsustainable resource use but rather that industrial technology sets in motion a
vicious  circle  of  lost  autonomy and  commodification  (i.e.,  more  and  more  human  needs  are  met
through money exchange).  Consequently, people are forced to work more and more in order to afford
the  needs  that  industrial  production  monopolizes  and  that  were  previously  satisfied  in  non-
commodified ways.  
Illich places particular emphasis on the structure of the tool itself as opposed to the structure of the
relations in which the tool is embedded.  However, Deriu points out that tools do not exist in a vaccuum
and that even seemingly convivial tools (such as the sewing machine, as Illich identifies) can be used in
non-convivial ways (e.g., sewing machines in a sweatshop).  This does not mean that Illich's analysis of
industrial technics is unwarranted but that the “structure of social relations and the structure of the
instrument are codetermined and develop in a circular and non-unidirectional fashion” (Deriu, 2014, p.
81).  This ambiguity can lead to situations where it is unclear whether technology can be considered
convivial or not, such as the Internet.  
It  is  also worth noting  that  Illich  did  not  condemn industrial  production  altogether  but  only its
monopoly form.  From his standpoint it is desirable to have a balance between industrial production
and those tools which favour personal autonomy.  A convivial reconstruction would also require limits
24 Humans operate according to “exosomatic” evolution whereby they have partially transgressed biological 
(“endosomatic”) evolution through their incorporation of external energy and external tools, along with the human 
social capacity for shared representations and planned organization.
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on the rate of change of technology (Deriu, 2014, p. 81).  
The contemporary degrowth literature does not have much written on actual alternative technological
systems.  Alexander (2012, p. 17) calls for a transition to renewable energy sources and Domènech et
al. (2013) investigate alternative means of providing water in Barcelona.  However, in general there is a
greater focus on the social  acceptability of degrowth ideas and the macroeconomic structures of a
degrowth economy than on the actual material basis of a degrowth society.  While there is a rejection of
the  ecological  modernization  discourse  and  its  technological  optimism  (and  certain  degrowth
precursors, like Gorz, have much hope for the 3D-printing, makerspace movement of recent years),
clearly more research is needed into the technological basis for a degrowth society in the absence of
fossil fuels.  What might be that balance between industrial and convivial technology and how can this
balance be achieved in a transition from current levels of technological development?  Who will decide
on  the  technology  to  be  adopted?   This  question  implies  the  need  for  different  levels  of  social
deliberation over the kinds of technology that should be fostered; instead of primarily private investors
making  those  choices  with  the  only avenue  for  social  choice  being  exhibited  in  the  market  after
production has already been carried out.  
2.2.6 Resource Caps
“[S]ince ... there is no such thing as the cost of undoing an irreparable harm or reversing an
irrevocable depletion, and since no relevant price can be set on avoiding the inconvenience
if future generations cannot bid on the choice, we must insist that the measures taken ...
should consist of quantitative regulations, notwithstanding the advice of most economists
to increase the allocation efficiency of the market through taxes or subsidies” (Georgescu-
Roegen, 2011a, p. 90 [1972])
Kallis et al. (2012) identify resource caps as a potential degrowth reform.  As the above quote from
G-R  argues,  taxation  and  subsidies  are  not  stringent  enough.   “Let  no  one  ...  forget  that  the
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irresponsible deforestation of numerous mountains took place because 'the price was right' and that it
was brought to an end only after quantitative restrictions were introduced” (Georgescu-Roegen, 2011a,
p. 90 [1972]).  
Since  quantitative  limits  decrease  the  supply  and  therefore  increase  the  price  of  goods,  they
essentially have the same effect as a tax but with the benefit of immediately achieving the desired effect
rather than merely encouraging but not ensuring the use of alternative resources.  In the case of fossil
fuels the rise in price (ideally phased in over time as the cap is lowered) would send ripple effects
throughout  the  economy and  encourage  either  reduced  consumption  or  a  switch  to  less  resource
intensive production methods. 
It is worth noting that while fossil fuels are amenable to a declining cap and trade system, this could
trigger the renewed exploitation of renewable energy sources provided that the demand for energy does
not decline to the same extent as the decline in energy that fossil fuels provide.  But renewable energy
sources (e.g., forests) cannot be managed via a cap and trade system since they represent living systems
that cannot be utilized in a purely quantitative manner.  In other words, there is a difference between
the clearcutting of a forest and selective logging.  So in addition to fossil fuel caps (which could also
take the form of geographical planning or the rejection of certain techniques such as fracking) there
would have to be systems to maintain renewable energy sources and ensure they aren't irreversibly
degraded.  
2.2.7 Population Limits
 We have seen that G-R recommends reducing the world population to that which can be fed by
organic agriculture, which is due to the unsustainable nature of conventional agriculture. Usually any
talk  of  controlling  the  population  is  controversial,  however  G-R's  basic  rationale  is  hard  to  argue
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against.   Martinez-Alier  (2009) has  identified  three  strains  of  Malthusianism:  1)  that  of  Malthus
himself,  who  crudely  argued  that  population  growth  would  always  be  checked  by  natural  limits
(according to mathematical formulas), 2) the Neo-Malthusians (circa 1900) who organized collectively
in  anti-capitalist  ways  and  believed  that  humans  could  regulate  their  population  growth  through
contraception,  and  3)  the  Neo-Malthusians  of  the  1960s  and  1970s  who  advocated  a  top-down
approach  to  population  control  and  believed  that  population  was  the  root  of  global  poverty  and
environmental destruction.  It is the second group that Martinez-Alier identifies as an inspiration for the
degrowth movement.  The neo-Malthusianism of this era was part of a radical, feminist movement in
the US and Europe (Martinez-Alier, 2009, pp. 1114–1115).  In France it took the name of la grève des
ventres (“strike of the bellies”).  In the US, Emma Goldman's writing is indicative (see Goldman,
1916).  There was a similar movement in India (as part of the “self respect” movement) and
similar sentiment in the writing of a Brazilian anarchist (‘Love one another more and do not
multiply so much').  
It would seem that the contemporary degrowth literature does not advocate any institutional changes
related to population (unless related to women's control over reproduction), advocating instead for the
reproductive  rights  of  women amidst  a  movement  that  recognizes  the threat  of  population  growth
against wage levels, sustainability, and human subsistence (Martinez-Alier, 2014).  Yet, there is some
debate, since Kerschner (2010), in comparing degrowth and the steady-state, has argued that degrowth
does not take the population question seriously enough, especially in the context of a decline in fossil
fuel energy.  
2.2.8 Public Money and Debt Audits
Probably the most ambitious monetary reform from the degrowth literature is that of public money.
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Mary Mellor explains: 
“Proposals to create new public money as a public resource would aim to create all new
money either under democratic control through a national monetary budget or through an
independent monetary authority (Jackson and Dyson 2013).  Public money would be issued
free  of  debt  and would  be  spent  directly  into  the  economy.   Enough money could  be
circulated  to  enable  sufficiency  provisioning  and  needs-led  economic  activity  (Mellor
2010).” (Mellor, 2014, p. 176)
Mellor thinks that the loaning of money with the expectation of interest creates a growth imperative
that is endogenous to the money system.  As such she accords much significance to the idea of a “debt-
free” money supply.  She is not alone in this view, however this growth imperative has recently been
challenged by Jackson and Victor  (2015).   If  we discard the  idea  that  the existing money system
produces an inherent growth imperative then the idea of public money becomes more a question of
social control over finance according to criteria other than maximum profitability (depending on the
investment).  Investments could be purposely made in areas that do not generate a profitable return,
such as the purchase of land to establish a nature reserve.  
Debt-audits have to do with assessing the legitimacy of accrued debt.  It is noted that debt can be
used by powerful social classes to maintain hierarchical order through social customs and laws that
prioritize  debt  repayment  (Cutillas  et  al.,  2014,  p.  156).   Also,  that  debts  often  “originate  in
circumstances that are unjust due to violence and the exercise of undue power” (Cutillas et al., 2014, p.
156).  Thus, a debt audit is performed (often by citizen groups or citizen groups in partnership with
government) to decide which parts of a country's debt is legitimate and which are not.  This practice
will likely need to be a key part of any transition, to take into account the historical role that debt has
played in subordinating countries in the Global South to those in the Global North.  
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2.2.9 Limitations on Private Property
Griethuysen argues that “private property must be constrained within a set of collectively agreed
social minima and environmental maxima” (Kallis et al., 2012, p. 176).  In other words, there should be
limits  on what  can be done with property (whether private,  common,  state,  or open-access).   It  is
further suggested that common property regimes and state property regimes might be more conducive
to a degrowth transition than those of a private nature (Kallis et al., 2012, p. 176).  
2.3 Discussion
In considering how these reforms challenge capitalism, it  is clear that they do in several crucial
respects.  First,  limitations  on  private  property  through  the  construction  of  collective  forms  of
ownership in the areas of production, land, and finance, would undermine the private property basis on
which capitalism is based.  Second, the implementation of declining caps on the use of fossil fuels and
limits on the use of other resources would directly challenge the accumulation of capital that rests on
the appropriation of “Cheap Nature”.  Third, the idea of lowering labour productivity would seem to
directly contradict the tendency to maximize labour productivity under capitalism.  
The degrowth reforms elaborated above are largely consistent with those advocated by the steady-
state literature (except perhaps in the area of population control)  (Kallis et al., 2012, p. 175).  This
might  seem  strange  given  the  differences  between  ecological  economics  and  degrowth  identified
previously.   However,  while  the  steady-state  literature  considers  these  institutional  reforms  at  the
theoretical  level,  the  degrowth  literature  more  actively  discusses  the  political  feasibility  of  these
reforms in practice (Kallis et al., 2012, pp. 177–178).   
However, the way that these reforms are brought together and integrated is crucial and can open
degrowth up to critique.  For example, Foster (2011) has criticized degrowth (especially Latouche) for
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not challenging any of the institutions of capitalism, such as private property.  While it is clear that
there is a certain focus on overcoming private property within the degrowth literature (in terms of
creating  co-operative  ownership  structures)  this  is  not  considered  as  the  central  component  of  a
degrowth  transition  and  can  romanticize  the  voluntary  proliferation  of  co-operatives  without  state
support.  Co-operatives are sometimes considered another element in a list  of things that could be
conducive  to  a  degrowth  transition;  not  as  a  way of  over-turning  one  of  the  defining  long-term
characteristics of the capitalist system.  
Blauwhof (2012) has suggested that the socio-economic reforms proposed by ecological economics
(and  degrowth  since  they  recommend  similar  things)  not  be  dismissed  out  of  hand  but  rather
reconsidered with the benefits of a Marxian analysis.  Drawing on the steady-state literature, Blauwhof
identifies seven reforms that overlap more or less with what I  have listed in the previous section:
minimum and maximum income,  progressive taxation,  job guarantee,  basic  income,  reduced work
hours, spreading ownership of wealth and business, and creating producer co-operatives.  The first five
are considered redistributive and unlikely to fundamentally challenge the accumulation imperative25;
since they leave the structural power of the capitalist class intact.  The last reform, democratizing the
workplace through producer co-operatives, is considered the most promising but it is noted that co-
operatives will still have an incentive to grow in a competitive market environment.  What is needed
then is “if not a complete abolition of commodity production for the market, at least some kind of
effective regulation, whether provided by a state or an umbrella organisation set up by the cooperatives
themselves” (Blauwhof, 2012, p. 260).
Marx originally conceived of the “metabolic  rift”  as  a  rupture in  the recycling of soil  nutrients
25 With the possible exception of the job guarantee, since it allows for some political determination of work to be done 
independently of market pressure.
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between the town and the country.  This occurred because agricultural products were being used to feed
a growing urban population without returning the waste to the soil, which undermined soil fertility in
the long-term.   Foster  (2000) generalized this  concept  to  apply to  the way that  capitalism created
subsequent “rifts” in order to temporarily overcome previous ones.  For example, importing guano
from Pacific islands to fertilize English farm fields.  Or creating synthetic fertilizer using the energy
from fossil fuels, which not only disrupted the global nitrogen cycle but also the global carbon cycle.
Moore (2000) then further expanded the concept of the metabolic rift to apply to the entire history of
capitalism. Getting rid of capitalism then requires repairing this metabolic rift.  This will require living
within  the  regenerative  capacity  of  ecosystems  as  the  degrowth  literature  recognizes.   Yet,  the
metabolic  rift,  while  constitutive  of  capitalism  is  part  of  the  larger  whole  of  private  property,
imperialism, markets, and shared representations (i.e., culture).  
Thus, the need for a suite of reforms. Certainly, any one reform taken in isolation will not result in a
break from the current system.  For example, the implementation of a basic income is being trialed in
Ontario  (Israel,  2016),  however  this  is  taking  place  in  a  context  of  increased  privatization  of
government services, such as the provincial electric utility  (Marchese, 2015).   This is why a basic
income is often supported across the political spectrum, because it can be implemented in different
ways.  However, a basic income must only be a complementary measure to the reconfiguration of the
ownership  structures  and  division  of  labour  that  currently  deprive  many  people  of  a  sense  of
meaningful work, in jobs that are contributing to the medium-term (short-term?) disruption of a stable
climate system for human civilization.  In the same way, the international Conference of Parties can
agree to limit the global temperature increase to 1.5ºC (Goldenberg, Vidal, Taylor, Vaughan, & Harvey,
2015) while many world leaders continue to promote trade agreements in an attempt to jump-start
accumulation through greater exploitation of natural resources.  At the same time, trade agreements
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give further power to corporate actors and tie the hands of states to make the needed changes to their
economies  to  meet  their  carbon  emissions  targets.   This  is  the  strengthening  of  private  property
regimes, the global market, and the exploitation of natural resources, which is expected to lead to lower
carbon dioxide emissions.  
A change in values and a re-evaluation of human need is also necessary (as the degrowth literature
explicitly recognizes) but cannot, I think, be seen independently of restoring individual and collective
autonomy from the  grips  of  a  globalized  market  designed  for  corporate  dominance.   Practically,
implementing limits on resource use will require not only overcoming the power of private investment
and  finance,  but  also  a  reorientation  of  the  collective  ends  of  society26,  less  energy and  material
intensive consumption patterns, greater equality to ensure that declines in living standard are shared, a
shift to a different energy system, and different methods of production and consumption.  
The actual physical transformation of infrastructure and technological forms is a key element in
imposing restrictions  on  fossil  fuels.   Since  you  can't  stop using  fossil  fuels  if  alternative  energy
sources are not capable of meeting basic needs.  To a certain extent consumption can be reduced and
collectivized  (e.g.,  public  transit  as  opposed  to  private  automobiles,  sharing  of  tools)  but  not  all
consumption can be done away with and alternative energy sources must be cultivated to meet those
needs.  The greatest technological challenge will be moving towards local and regional production and
consumption.  This will likely require great changes in how land is used within and around our cities,
not to mention the capacity of surrounding ecosystems to support the current population levels.
Yet this will happen only through political struggle over the types of technology and organizational
structures  necessary for  the  transition.   As Gorz  says:  “The theoretical  and practical  definition  of
26 Re-evaluating the idea of endless progress, a growth for growth's sake attitude, and excessive individualism.
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alternative  technologies,  and the  struggle  of  communities  and  individuals  to  win,  collectively and
individually, control over their own destinies, must be the permanent focus of political action” (André
Gorz, 1980, p. 20).
2.4 Connections to Economic Democracy (and markets)
The degrowth institutional reforms have much in common with an Economic Democracy agenda as
proposed by Malleson (2014).  For instance, the focus on cooperative work, the reform of the financial
system, strong measures of wealth redistribution, some kind of job/income security, and even the use of
quantitative  limits  on  resource  use.   The contemporary degrowth literature  emphasizes  democracy
(although not always strongly or consistently) and the repoliticization of the economic, which are also
consistent  with Economic  Democracy.   However,  there  is  also  an emphasis  within  degrowth of  a
“downscaling ... of the role of markets and commercial exchanges as a central organizing principle of
human  lives”  (Sekulova,  Kallis,  Rodríguez-Labajos,  &  Schneider,  2013,  p.  1);  a  sentiment  that
Malleson  does  not  completely  share.  Schumacher,  as  well,  has  called  the  market,  the
“institutionalization of individualism and non-responsibility” (Schumacher, 1989, p. 42).  Further:
“In the market place... innumerable qualitative distinctions which are of vital importance
for man and society are suppressed; they are not allowed to surface.  Thus the reign of
quantity  celebrates  its  greatest  triumph  in  'The  Market'.   Everything  is  equated  with
everything else.   To equate things  means to give them a price and thus to make them
exchangeable.  To the extent that economic thinking is based on the market, it takes the
sacredness out of life, because there can be nothing sacred in something that has a price”
(Schumacher, 1989, p. 43).  
Here  Schumacher  reveals  the  reductionist  tendency  of  the  market  to  make  everything
interchangeable, especially those things which should not be; for example, fossil fuels.  Similarly, the
quest  to  incorporate  everything  into  the  market  by  assigning  it  a  price  runs  up  against  obvious
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problems.  For example, Gorz says: “Then, dear neoliberal economists, tell us quickly: how much is a
ray of sunlight worth?  Fresh air without lead or sulphur fumes?  A dip in the sea or the lakes?” (André
Gorz, 1980, p. 65).
Blauwhof (2012; cited in the previous section) has suggested that commodity production for the
market  must  either  be abolished or  subject  to  strong regulation by the state  or  a  worker  umbrella
organization, in conjunction with the proliferation of worker cooperatives.  Also, Klitgaard and Krall
(2012) argue in the journal  of  Ecological  Economics  that  “[m]arkets are  more than just  allocative
mechanisms. They are also social institutions. There are no allocatively efficient markets that can be
easily disentangled from this broader economic reality. Rather than treating markets as single purpose
allocative  mechanisms,  we  believe  it  is  more  productive  to  abandon  the  disaggregation  of  scale,
distribution, and allocation and the premise of efficient allocation and treat markets as a component of
an integrated whole called the Market System, or capitalism” (p. 248).  This was written in response to
the thought of some ecological economists who argue that the market can provide optimal allocation of
resources  but  cannot  (or  should  not)  designate  the  scale  of  economic  processes  or  an  optimal
distribution of resources27.  
On the contrary, Malleson (2014) argues that markets can be successfully embedded within other
democratic institutions.  However, Malleson also does not argue against economic growth, which led
me to think about the relation between markets, growth, and democratic control of the economy.  Can a
market society be amenable to the kinds of changes that the degrowth literature calls for?  Many of the
institutional reforms that degrowth calls for assume the existence of the market, so one would assume
so.  Is it possible to remove the economy from market control completely and operate on the basis of
27 Allocation is the division of resource flow among alternative product use, whereas distribution is the division of the 
resource flow, embodied in products, among different people.
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full planning?  In the second part of this paper I will consider these interconnections and compare the
market model with a more explicitly planned approach.  
3. Part 2: Democratizing the Economy
This  part  of  the  paper  arose  out  of  two contradictions:  1)  the  need for  a  decline  in  the  use  of
energy/materials in the Global North coupled with the seeming inability of people to make collective
decisions in this regard (even if individually they recognize that consumption patterns must change),
and 2) a contradiction that I identified between two books that were both quite persuasive.  The first is
Tom Malleson's After Occupy: Economic Democracy for the 21st Century and the second was Richard
Smith's Green Capitalism: The God That Failed.  Both are about replacing capitalism with a different
system, one that can be subject to democratic control.  Malleson's book retained the market mechanism
while Smith called fairly explicitly for a non-market approach (although he admitted that he couldn't
spell out the exact mixture of “planning, rationing, and democracy” (Smith, 2015, p. 102)).  While I am
inclined to agree with much of Smith's analysis around the urgency and need for broad-scale planning
of the economy in light of the climate crisis, this part about completely abolishing the market struck me
as undeveloped, whereas Malleson's analysis of the market was quite well articulated.  I realized that
this  debate between the market and planning was part  of a longer (and larger) one around market
socialism.  I think it is important to revisit this debate because of the implications it has on potential
transition paths.  If  the market  is  inherently isolating and individualizing and perpetuates  a growth
dynamic through competitive behaviour, then what is to be done?  On the other hand, if the market can
be accommodated to democratic control (including a degrowth agenda) then this may make a transition
easier in the sense that we do not have to invent entirely new coordinating institutions.  
It may be argued that of course we will have to maintain the market in the near future; but then what
of long term goals?  The degrowth literature seems to suggest that market exchange will recede in
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importance, although this would appear to go hand in hand with the relocalization of production and a
more self-sufficient / communal provision of goods and services.  What about with a more complex
division  of  labour?   In  the  course  of  interrogating  the  market  other  ideas  for  democratizing  the
economy will be exposed (both market and non-market).  First, I will outline the history of economic
democracy and market socialism.  Second I will summarize the arguments for and against the market,
as debated in the New Left Review, and in the accounts of McNally and Malleson.  Finally I will
summarize the institutional reforms that are revealed along the way.  
3.1 Economic Democracy
In  his  1980  essay  Capitalism  or  Worker  Control?:  An  Ethical  and  Economic  Appraisal David
Schweickart set out a model of socialism that he would explicitly call Economic Democracy in his
1993 book Against Capitalism.  Schweickart is an American mathematician and philosopher.  The use
of  the  term “economic  democracy”  actually  goes  back even further,  at  least  to  1920 when C.  H.
Douglas, a British engineer, published Economic Democracy which argued for monetary reform based
on the observation that systematically workers were not paid enough to buy back what they had made.
Although  Douglas'  use  of  the  term does  not  do  justice  to  the  kind  of  reforms that  Malleson and
Schweickart defend, his ideas did have some influence in Alberta as part of a political party that came
to power in 1935.  
In his 2014 book Malleson writes about democratizing the economy (parts of which he borrows from
Schweickart).   The  book  is  divided  into  three  sections:  co-operative  work,  the  market,  and
finance/investment.  The market would still play a pivotal role in distributing goods and services, while
the surplus is socialized (amongst workers in each firm or amongst society generally in the case of
nationally  owned  firms)  and  production  in  the  workplace  and  finance/investment  is  subject  to
democratic  accountability.   Economic  activity  is  still  regulated  and  planned  by  government,  as
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currently exists, except the regulatory process could not be influenced by a capitalist class interested
solely in maximizing return on investment (since the economy would be largely composed of worker
co-ops and nationalized firms).  As Malleson admits, the model that he has laid out is really a form of
market socialism.  
3.2 Market Socialism
The  market  socialism  tradition  was  revived  in  1983  with  the  publication  of  Alec  Nove's  The
Economics of Feasible Socialism which was written in reaction to the economics of the Soviet Union,
of which he was considered an expert.  This book precipitated a debate in the journal of the New Left
Review (based in the UK) in which Nove,  Ernest Mandel,  Diane Elson,  Paul Auerbach,  Meghnad
Desai, Ali Shamsavari, and Robin Blackburn participated.  The debate centres on whether the market is
a necessary or desirable mechanism to coordinate production and consumption in a future socialist
economy.
First, Ernest Mandel wrote a response to Nove's book defending a planned economy in a 1986 issue.
Then, Nove wrote a response to Mandel in 1987.  Mandel wrote another response in 1988.  Later in
1988 Paul Auerbach, Meghnad Desai, and Ali Shamsavari wrote an article in response to Mandel; and
Diane  Elson wrote  on socialized  markets  in  response  to  both  Nove and Mandel.   In  1991 Robin
Blackburn wrote a historical account of the market socialist debate, not specifically responding to the
particular ideas or positions already outlined, but ultimately expressing support for Elson's position.  A
little later in 1993 David McNally of York University wrote a book called Against the Market which
argued  against  the  market  socialist  position  as  portrayed  in  various  forms  by  Nove,  Elson,  and
Blackburn (among others).  This written debate took place within the context of both neoliberalism and
the decline and fall of Communism in the Soviet Union.  
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This is not meant to be an exhaustive account of the market socialism debate.  Indeed, McNally
shows that the debate has been going on in radical political economy since Adam Smith, and Blackburn
shows that it was active within the Soviet-Marxist tradition and economics profession during the early
20th century  (e.g.,  the  “calculation  debate”).    There  have  also  been  other  more  recent  accounts.
However, including Malleson, this selection of work should provide adequate coverage of the market
debate.  
3.3 The Market
Clearly, there is much debate over the role of the market in a future economy.  Market socialists (and
market capitalists) generally argue that the market is necessary to coordinate production on a large
scale with many different products.  Also, that the market does not in itself lead to undesirable social
consequences; that the market should not be confused with capitalism as a whole.  In contrast, those
against the market generally argue that the Soviet Union cannot be used to definitively demonstrate the
failure of economic planning, that democratic planning on such a large scale is possible, that the market
(and the  competition  implied)  does  not  dispense  with  capital  accumulation  or  a  market  in  human
labour, and that market socialism would not lead to full control over the economy.  
3.3.1 Nove
Alec Nove wrote the  Economics of Feasible Socialism after a nineteen year career as Professor of
Economics at the University of Glasgow.  He was born in Russia but was educated in England, and he
was considered an expert on Soviet economy.  He was particularly concerned with presenting a model
of socialism that he thought would be feasible given the current state of human nature and society.
Based on the experience of the Soviet  Union this  could only be a  market  model.   To this  end he
recommended a mixed model of ownership with five levels including: private individuals, small-scale
private firms, co-operative firms, state-owned enterprises with full autonomy, and centrally controlled
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and administered state  enterprises.   The banks and other  credit  institutions  would be of this  latter
centrally controlled form, as would other things that operate with large, closely interrelated units (due
to technological economies of scale) or exhibit a natural monopoly.   Some examples given are the
electricity grid, large integrated steel works, rail networks, and oil/petrochemical complexes.   These
centralized  state-owned  enterprises  could  be  subject  to  “tripartite  supervision”,  with  management
responsible to the state, the users and the workforce.  Not that this accountability would be simple or
easy to achieve.  Socialized and co-operative enterprises would have managers appointed by an elected
committee  of  workers  and  the  division  of  functions  could  be  democratically  decided  amongst
management, the elected council, and the rest of the workforce in light of their own experience.  The
main difference between socialized and co-operative enterprise is the difference in property relations;
in the former the means of production would belong to the state.  Private property would be subject to
limits such as a certain number of employed people or on the value of capital assets, and could vary by
sector.  Above this limit their could be a choice to convert into a co-operative or a socialized enterprise,
with proper compensation for the original entrepreneur.  
As  for  planning,  major  investments  would  be  handled  by  the  state,  planners  would  monitor
decentralized  investments  (to  avoid  duplication  and clearly unsound projects),  major  public  goods
would be extensively planned (e.g., electricity, oil, railways), and ground-rules would be set for the
autonomous and free sectors to operate within.  In addition, there would also be functions associated
with foreign trade and the drafting of long-term plans for approval by the legislature.  “The centre”
would have a vital role in ensuring a balance between the present and the future, including the overall
level of investment.  Democratic vote could decide the boundary between the commercial or market
sectors and those where goods and services could be provided free.  
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3.3.2 Mandel: Respone to Nove
Ernest Mandel was a revolutionary Marxist, member of the Fourth International, and a fairly prolific
author  (Lowy, 2009).  In Defence of Socialist Planning (1986) provides a response to Nove's 1983
book, arguing against the market and in favour of a democratically planned economy.  The article is
divided into eight sections.  The first section is broadly about how the level of planning within the large
firm is suggestive of how an entire economy can be planned (Auerbach et al. are critical of this view as
we shall see); that the tendency within capitalism is towards a fully planned economy (p. 6). Second, it
is argued that for many necessary goods (such as water) the amount of use does not depend on price
(i.e., people simply use what they need), and that with the advance of the productive forces the number
of goods society can distribute free of charge can progressively increase (p.  13).  Third,  that basic
human needs are relatively predictable and that it would be simpler and more democratic to simply ask
people what their needs are rather than interpose the medium of money (p. 17).  Further, that market
relations be reserved for those non-essential goods and services, where real choice (i.e., not based on
subsistence)  can actually be exercised (p.  20).  Fourth,  he suggests that market  incentives  (such as
different wage levels or productivity bonuses) inevitably leads to the work of the producers (e.g., the
intensity or duration) being subordinated to the needs of consumers (pp. 21-22).  Fifth, that informal
cooperation  and  relations  of  familiarity  between  firms,  and  between  consumers  and  firms,  often
override market signals (i.e., changing prices); and that this requires neither a real market economy nor
a bureaucratically centralized planning (pp. 22-23).  Sixth, that the loss of market incentives would not
impact the degree of innovation, since this is often not the primary motivation anyway.
In  section  seven  Mandel  outlines  how  his  democratic  planning  would  function,  what  he  calls:
“articulated  worker  self-management”  (p.  26).   Essentially,  it  would  involve  elected  councils  of
workers at the national or international level who decide between different combinations of “average
43
workload (length of the working week); ... priority needs to be satisfied for all through guaranteed
allocation of resources ('free' distribution); volume of resources devoted to 'growth' (reserve fund +
consumption of additional population + net investment as a function of technological choices again
clearly spelt  out);  volume of resources  left  for  'non-essential'  goods and services to  be distributed
through money mechanisms; minimum and maximum money incomes; pricing policy for marketable
goods and services” (p. 27).  On the basis of these decisions a more detailed plan is drawn up on the
basis of input-output tables and material balances, indicating the resources available for each separate
branch of production (industry sectors, transportation, agriculture, etc.) and for social life (education,
health, communications, etc.).  Self-managing bodies would then divide up the workload according to
their various capacities.  Consumer good production would be based on feedback between workers'
councils and elected consumer representatives.  
   Finally, in section eight it is argued that Nove's model of mixed ownership and mixture of plan and
market suffers from three (actually four) pitfalls.  First, the retention of the profit motive within each
economic unit, which would introduce powerful impulses toward economic irrationality as decisions
are taken as a function of particular, fragmented interests (i.e., the workers in each firm would pursue
their own collective self-interest). Second, the retention of income differentials, which, contra Nove,
can be abolished on a large scale and have been abolished for quite large groups of people including
trade unions and churches.  Third, the argument that large scale organizations cannot be self-managed
by the  producers  due to  the technical  scale  and complexity.  Mandel  argues  that  they can  be self-
managed through the formation of small cells of workers who then appoint delegates to make decisions
at a higher level.  Fourth, the retention of competition and monetary incentives, which Mandel argues,
similar to point one, would undermine the solidarity necessary for a socialist economy to function.
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3.3.3 Nove: Response to Mandel
Nove's 1987 article in response clarifies the stakes of the argument: that the transition to socialism
will involve gradually dispensing with the market; a proposition that Nove disagrees with.  His key
arguments are 1) the inevitable centralizing tendency involved with fully planned production, 2) the
inevitability of fragmented interest, 3) the inevitability of competition, and 4) the necessity of rewards
and  differentials  to  elicit  the  desired  effort.   On  the  necessity  of  a  centralized  authority:  “Unless
'abundance' is assumed, in the sense that there is enough for everyone and so no problem of mutually
exclusive choices, some body (somebody) must allocate resources between alternative uses.  Yes, the
market  does  this  too,  and does  it  imperfectly.   But  the existence of  innumerable freely-negotiated
horizontal contractual links removes an otherwise impossible burden from the centre...” (p. 100).  On
the second point it is argued that a central authority (even an elected one) will unavoidably make errors
in distribution due to inadequate information and particular interests on the part of the planners.  Thus,
the problem of particular, fragmented interests operating in a market economy is equally problematic
under  one  that  is  democratically  planned.   Third,  competition  is  an  inevitable  result  of  consumer
choice, since producers necessarily compete for the limited preferences of consumers.  Fourth, while
higher forms of motivation (e.g., “commitment, loyalty, pride in work well done, a sense of service to
the community” (p. 103)) are desirable and preferable, the “acquisition of purchasing power is, and is
likely to remain, one of the more important (though I trust not the sole) human motive” (p. 103).  Nove
contends that these motivations are capable of coexisting within individuals.  
3.3.4 Elson: Response to Nove and Mandel
In 1988, Diane Elson wrote an article Market Socialism or Socialization of the Market? in which she
argues that the market is necessary but should be socialized (i.e., publicly provided).  Further, socialism
is not defined as the absence of commodity production (production for monetary exchange) but as an
economy that is concerned primarily with the production and reproduction of labour power, rather than
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capital28.  For her the question should rather be about “whether the conditions necessary for the market
to function adequately as a form of free association can actually be sustained” (Elson, 1988, p. 4).  Her
major criticism of Nove is his idealized model of the market.  “A market is a cash nexus between
buyers and sellers, but this nexus does not just exist; it has to be made” (p. 10).  Consequently, the
amount of resources and human labour that goes into the market must be recognized and not assumed
to be a costless process in contrast  to the administrative inefficiencies of planning.  Primarily,  the
market is constructed by profit-seeking enterprises who have control over means of trade such as credit,
communications, transport, warehousing and information. The government intervenes as a regulator
and  provider  of  infrastructure  but  mostly  the  creation  of  markets  is  devolved  to  self-financing
enterprises who must recoup the costs of market-making through sales.  Further, certain firms operate
to set price norms, which ensures a degree of stability but at the same time concentrates price-making
influence.  Later in the paper she will suggest that a proper socialist response to markets is to have them
be publicly provided, with certain conditions for entry.  
Elson's criticism of Mandel is that he not only rejects the market, but also prices, which she sees as
essential (along with Nove).  First, she claims that Mandel's starting point of dividing up the Gross
National Product  (at  the national or international  level)  implies prices of some kind.  Second,  she
questions whether his  system is  flexible enough to meet the (often unexpected) changing needs of
families,  and  that  his  conception  of  consumer  needs  dominating  producer  needs  is  both  heavily
gendered (in that many women do not engage in productive activity outside of the house) and not the
root cause of the ills with which he associates it.  “The adverse effects Mandel sees as stemming from
'consumer freedom', such as unemployment, speed-up, health hazards, 'the authoritarian discipline of
production squads', do not arise from consumer choice per se but depend on the overall conditions in
28 This resonates with Schumacher's “economics as if people mattered”
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which choice is exercised” (p. 25).  Third, it is unclear how his concept of self-management would
resolve  the  tensions  between  production  units  that  would  face  much  the  same  problems  as  the
Ministries in the USSR.  “Self-management in itself would not overcome divisions between different
self-managing groups” (p. 25).  
However, she recognizes that prices can have irrational outcomes.  One of the fundamental criticisms
of the market is that it atomizes decision-making and therefore does not consider how decisions made
by individuals or firms are affected by the decisions that other units make.  This can lead to irrational
results, for example, the pig-cycle29.  “The problem is that the steps which an isolated decision-maker
in a sequential process takes to limit his or her risks, may increase the risk to which the system as a
whole is subject” (p. 18).  This is also the problem that can lead to a lack of aggregate demand in a
market  economy (since  in  the  face  of  an  uncertain  future  isolated  economic  units  can  attempt  to
maintain flexibility by holding money) although Elson asserts that this is mostly a problem of money
being used as capital (i.e., money in pursuit of more money).  This is so because “if an enterprise is not
confident of selling its output, it makes more sense to hold on to money, rather than use it to buy means
of production and labour power” (p. 20).  Since corporations can generally put off consumption longer
than households (because they don't need to eat; although their owners do), economic crises can be
exacerbated.   The Keynesian answer is  to correct these micro-economic irrationalities with macro-
economic spending by government to stimulate the economy in times of recession and curtail spending
(and tax back the wealth) when the economy is doing well.  Yet this “intervention in markets provides
no institutions to facilitate collective reflection before individual units take decisions” (p. 20).  One
possible mechanism to offset isolated decisions is the nexus of informal relationships that has been
shown to play a vital role in economic coordination (outside of markets or regulations).  This can be
29 “When the price of bacon is high farmers breed more pigs; when all the pigs are grown enough to be marketed for 
bacon, this pushes down the price and results in a reduction in pig breeding, which in turn leads to a rise in the price of 
bacon, and so on.” (Elson, 1988, p. 18)
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understood  as  an  “implicit  contract  or  a  moral  commitment  which  helps  to  cement  continuity  in
relations between buyers and sellers” (p. 22).  The problem for Elson is how to institutionalize this
nexus; “how to ensure that the cooperation is freely given, genuinely a product of trust or goodwill” (p.
22).  Indeed, this underlies her whole project of market socialization in which the “nexus of trust,
reciprocity,  and  goodwill  [sets]  the  limits  within  which  the  market  operates,  rather  than  being
subordinate to the market” (p. 27).  
Two immediate features of Elson's socialism are the provision of a basic income and the public
provision of a number of services free of cost, including health, education, water, sanitation, possibly
transport, and information networks (p. 28).  These public services are provided for free because of the
nature of these services, not because they are “basic”30.  The last public service, information networks,
is essential for ensuring equal and easy access to information, a necessary condition of socializing the
market.  So what is a socialized market?  Firstly, it is “one in which the market is made by public
bodies, which are financed out of taxation of enterprises and households, rather than out of sales” (p.
32).   Another  aspect  is  the  information  network  just  mentioned  which  would  serve  the  role  of
institutionalizing the “informal relationships” nexus that market economies have found necessary to
construct to some degree.  Information that would be provided alongside the price of an item would be
the unit cost and mark-up, so that the price formation process is transparent to consumers.  The idea is
to overcome the secrecy which dominates the private market and encourage collaboration rather than
competition between firms.  This transparency would extend to production methods and production
plans.  Effectively there would be an “absence of private property in knowledge” (p. 42).  Third, the
market would be embedded within “buyer-seller networks”, the focus of which would not be prices and
30 Things that should be publicly and freely provided include “goods which by their nature cannot easily be parcelled up 
and charged for separately - such as street lighting, clean air, and services where there are strong 'spillover' effects, such 
as health and education, where one person's ill-health can be contagious, and one person's lack of adequate skills can 
reduce the performance of a whole team" (Elson, 2000, p. 9).  
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costs, but quantities and characteristics of goods and production processes” (p. 34).31  The tax-financed
secretariats of each buyer-seller network could “interact with a national planning agency to generate an
overall agreed strategy for the national economy” (p. 35).  “Overall economic planning has a vital role
to play in setting the parameters in which individual enterprises operate, and in anticipating major
interdependencies.   But it  would take the form of a guiding strategy, a vision of the future,  not a
procedure  for  detailed  allocation  of  material  inputs”  (p.  42).   What  would  prevent  cooperative
economic units from acting as collective capitalists?  “[A] process of social control is required at the
points of metamorphosis, so that enterprise performance has to meet certain social criteria before goods
and services can be sold or bought, surplus income retained and reinvested, or loans obtained” (p. 80).  
3.3.5 Blackburn: In Support of Elson
Robin Blackburn is a British historian and former editor of the New Left Review.  In 1991 he wrote
an article in the New Left Review that examined the question of the market through the history of the
Soviet Union.  His concern was with reorienting socialism after the collapse of the so-called communist
system.  He presents a detailed historical account of the intellectual debates around the market, Soviet
economics, and socialism.  His ultimate conclusion is that “for the foreseeable future” institutional
reform must include what Elson identified as the socialization of the market (Blackburn, 1991, p. 47).
He reaches this  conclusion after an interrogation of Soviet economic irrationalities and through an
engagement with critics of centralized distribution.  In his support of socializing the market he supports
a guaranteed income (p. 54), income differentials (p. 54) within maximum and minimum bounds (p.
52), disclosure of information on production costs (not just prices; p. 52), and limits on the size of
private firms after which they would have to be socialized (p. 50).  This is broadly in line with Elson
(and sometimes Nove), not to mention much of the degrowth literature. 
31 Note that this has much in common with Mandel's idea for coordination between workers' councils and consumer 
groups.
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3.3.6 McNally
David McNally is a professor of political economy at York University.  In 1993 he wrote a book that
investigates the history of market socialism, the roots of which can be found in the utopian socialist
tradition of the early 1800s.  Marx considered these socialists utopian because of their strategies for
social change; particularly their emphasis on constructing small-scale alternatives rather than building a
movement for taking political power.  Marx was particularly critical of Proudhon who did not advocate
class struggle or revolutionary action and favoured reform of the money system as opposed to a reform
of private property (McNally, 1993, p. 155).  McNally uses Marx's critique of these utopian socialists to
respond to contemporary market socialists such as Nove, Elson, and Blackburn32.  His essential point is
as follows:
“This, then,  is the central flaw in all notions of market socialism: by accepting market
relations (commodities, prices and wage-labour), market socialists must logically accept
the inevitable consequences of these relations – exploitation, class inequality and economic
crises.  But market socialists fail to see this because they do not understand that without the
market in human-labour there is no generalized commodity exchange.  If labour-power is
not bought and sold, it will not have a market-determined value.  And if this crucial input
into every production process is  not marketized,  then commodity exchange will  not be
general, and goods will not have true market values (since the labour embodied in them
will not have been priced by the market).  The only true market economy is thus a capitalist
economy with a generalized labour market – a point pursued in more detail in the next
chapter.  Market socialism thus means 'socialism' with wage-labour and exploitation – i.e.,
a non-socialism.  All talk of market socialism is for this reason illogical and incoherent.
This is why Marx insists that socialism requires the abolition of wage-labour – which can
only mean the decommodification of labour-power.  The elimination of exploitation and
class inequality is impossible without the abolition of the labour market.  And this can only
mean  the  demarketization  of  economic  life.   A  consistent  socialism  can  only  be
unrelentingly hostile to the market as regulator of economic relations.”
32 Although Elson and Blackburn would not consider themselves market socialists but rather “market socializers”.
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McNally argues that any retention of a market mechanism with wage-labour implies exploitation of
the direct producers by the means of production and the incessant drive to develop and expand them.
“One of the greatest misconceptions about capitalism is the notion that these tendencies flow from the
motivations of a class of private owners of the means of production” (p. 180).  Thus, worker collectives
will become their own collective capitalists, compelled to maximize labour productivity on pain of
bankruptcy.  It is only by overcoming the separation between producing units that the compulsion to
accumulate can be halted (p. 182).  
In McNally's model of planned production he still retains a market for non-essential goods (similar to
Mandel)  which he suggests  can be “regulated according to  social  criteria  and need not,  therefore,
involve any move towards market regulation” (p. 205).  But basic needs would be provided by planned
overproduction (to account for fluctuating demand) and distributed free of charge.  The only tangible
difference between this and Elson's market socialization is between the degree of free provision of
services.   This  is  a  serious  philosophical  difference  between  market  socialists  and  non-market
socialists: the sphere of free provision of services.  The latter argue for the free provision of basic needs
(food, shelter, clothing, etc.) while the former would retain a market in these goods while ensuring that
everyone has the means to purchase them (e.g., a basic income).  As McNally says: [t]he struggle to
liberate distribution of wealth from market regulation is a drive to supersede the principle of fee for
service.  What applies to socialized healthcare and education (at least to some degree in most advanced
capitalist  nations)  can equally apply to  housing,  basic  diet,  transportation,  communication,  energy,
recreation, and so on” (p. 203).  In this vein he suggests that the socialized markets advocated by Elson
“embody a fundamental contradiction: the coexistence of market and non-market logics of economic
regulation” (p. 215).  “Recognizing that autonomous markets are inherently asocial, I have argued that
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socialism  must  strive  to  limit,  restrict  and  subordinate  them  within  a  framework  governed  by  a
commitment to decommodifying economic life” (p. 215).  
3.3.7 Auerbach et al.
The conflation of the market and capitalism that McNally defends is rooted in the way that planning
and the market are seen as separate modes of regulation.  However, as Auerbach et al. say: “[m]arkets,
like other economic forms, are a product of human action and human consciousness as manifested in
acts of planning, and not entities whose necessary existence can be postulated away from the sphere of
planning and decision-making” (1988, p. 73).  In this article Auerbach et al. refute what Mandel and
others  have  tended  to  see  as  the  single  factory model  of  the  economy,  in  which  the  economy is
progressing towards fully planned control akin to a giant factory.  In contrast, “[e]ven the most recent
triumphs of capitalist planning and co-ordination within and between enterprises, such as the famous
Japanese kanban system for the control  of inventories  (stock and work in  progress),  emerge from
market pressures to minimize holding costs while retaining maximum flexibility to respond to changes
in demand” (p. 76).  Instead of the divide between planning and the market, in the history of capitalism
“we observe not objective, anonymous economic ‘laws of the market’, but a complex, dialectical and
symbiotic connection between firms, on the one hand, and the behavioural relations we reify with the
name ‘markets’ on the other” (p. 73).  
One implication of this is that planning, not just markets, is absolutely essential to capitalism; it is
just typically done for the benefit of capitalist and imperial interests.  As Smith (2015) says: 
“capitalists indirectly plan the national and global economies all the time.  They meet every
year  at  Davos to  shape the world market  for  their  benefit.   They conspire  to  privatize
medicine, schools, public transportation, force us to buy 'their' water or eat GMO foods.
They use the IMF and World Bank to shackle countries with debt, then open them up to
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U.S.  corporate  takeover.  They've  been  using  their  states  for  centuries  to  expropriate
peasants and tribes, even to exterminate them when necessary as in the Americas, to steal
and privatize common lands, break up pre-capitalist societies, re-organize, re-plan whole
continents to set up the right “business climate” for capital accumulation” (p. 103).  
Of course, socialism would have to have a substantial amount of planning, but of a more inclusive
kind and for different ends.  “In the absence of the mythical ‘natural rate of interest’ of economic
orthodoxy—which automatically solves all problems of weighing present against future benefits and
costs in the decision process—all economies must resolve the question of resource allocation through
time” (Auerbach et  al.,  1988,  p.  77).   Therefore,  “[a]ny socialist  society is  likely to  assume,  as  a
minimum,  substantial  direct  control  over  the  proportion  of  resources  allocated  to  investment.  By
imposing such control in an explicit way, society clarifies for itself the decision-making process by
which it creates its own future” (p. 77).  
3.3.8 Control over Investment
McNally recognizes this fundamental need for investment control: “whatever may be said about the
ability of markets to provide information relevant to individual decision-making – and this has been
vastly overrated – they are not equipped to calculate trans-individual effects and are thus biased against
social decision-making” (1993, p. 199).  Further, market information is “incapable of providing rational
criteria for investment” (p. 199).  Similarly, Elson has said that “[t]he atomized decision-making of the
market  enables  choice  to  be  made  between  alternative,  piecemeal,  marginal  adjustments,  but  not
between alternative states of the world: choice in the small does not provide choice in the large” (Elson,
1988, p. 18).  
Malleson  (2014,  Chapter  4) identifies  six  ways  that  markets  can  undermine  democracy.   First,
markets respond to purchasing power, so those with more of it have more say over what is produced.
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Second,  monopolies  can  distort  prices  away  from  their  true  social  costs  and  benefits.   Third,
externalities can be unreflected in market prices.  Fourth, markets are not very good at providing public
goods (those goods that once provided for some are difficult to keep from others).  Fifth, markets are
inadequate  guides  for  making long-term investment  decisions.   Finally,  markets  can  fail  to  reflect
collective choice since aggregating individual decisions is unlikely to accord with what people think is
best for society as a whole.  
The first three issues relate to what Malleson terms “consumer democracy” and the last three to
“citizen democracy”.   Malleson argues that consumer democracy can be achieved within a market
framework  by  ensuring  a  relatively  equal  distribution  of  wealth,  preventing  monopoly,  and
internalizing externalities via  regulation,  taxes,  and subsidies.   These things are  practical  problems
(albeit difficult) and not intrinsically a problem of the market institution.  However, the last three points
relate  to  citizen  democracy  which  the  market  is,  by  its  very  nature  of  short-term  preference
aggregation, incapable of supplying.  This then calls for public institutions that are capable of providing
this collective, long-term, public good decision making.  Essentially, this is a call for social deliberation
over investment decisions, since investment is the process, as already noted, by which we create our
own future.  
Malleson  (2014, Chapter 6) recommends four things to democratize finance and investment.  For
finance: capital controls and public community banks, for investment: co-operatives and participatory
budgeting.  Malleson distinguishes between finance as the provision of credit and investment as the
actual use of that credit to do something.  
Capital controls are simply regulations that control how money is brought in or out of a country.
They are necessary to prevent financial capital from “punishing” economies that attempt democratizing
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(or other social justice) reforms.  For instance, left-wing governments that have come to power have
historically been unable to carry out their mandates due to the economic turbulence exerted by capital
flight  (and  investment  strikes  by  business  but  that’s  an  investment  issue).   The  problem  is  that
democratic sovereignty is typically vested at the national level while the financial system is global.  If
financiers feel that a country’s change in governance will negatively affect their investments then they
will take their money elsewhere, devaluing the currency, making imports more expensive, resulting in
inflation, which further encourages financiers to leave (since inflation erodes the value of financial
capital), and so on.   All of this combined with the power of investment capital (i.e., business owners)
to halt their investments can lead to economic stagnation.  Thus, to safeguard democratic sovereignty,
capital controls are required. 
The second reform of finance is public community banks.  Basically it is argued that since finance is
so crucial to the functioning of the economy (serving as a way to resolve the time discrepancy between
when investments are made and gains realized), it essentially acts as a public utility.  Its purpose is
simply to enable other productive economic activity to happen, like the electricity network or the post
office.  Yet, the financial system is largely privatized in North American and the UK.  Which can lead
to the situation in 2008-2009 where the banks had to be bailed out because they were “too big to fail”.
The perverse incentive is that private banks can make risky decisions with few consequences because
the public sector has to bail them out anyway (resulting in a colossal redistribution of wealth from the
public sector to the private sector without any fundamental changes in ownership).  So banks should be
made a public  service;  but  how should they be set  up under  public  control  to enable the greatest
democratic participation?  The community in public community bank reflects the need to decentralize
the democratic control of finance beyond what could be provided by a state centred banking system.
Essentially  the  state  would  distribute  funds  to  municipalities  who  would  then  distribute  funds  to
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community  banks.   These  community  banks  (operating  as  non-profits)  would  provide  credit  to
businesses on the basis of three criteria: profitability, ability to create employment, and other municipal
priorities.  The bank staff would be public servants but a citizen advisory board would be set up in
order for community members to have a more direct say in deciding the local priorities that the bank
should prioritize in giving loans.  
In terms of democratizing investment, the spread of co-operatives would go a long way since, at least
within  individual  firms,  investment  decisions  would  no  longer  be  made  by  a  minority  owner  or
manager.  Also, the democratic control over credit vested in public community banks would indirectly
serve as a check on investment priorities.  This would also check the structural power of business
owners to implement a business strike (mentioned above), since everyone would be a part-owner.  In
terms  of  publicly  funded,  collectively  provided  services,  a  good  part  of  that  planning  could  be
decentralized through what has come to be known as participatory budgeting.  Of course, it would all
depend  on  the  scale  of  the  service  being  provided  but  generally  it  is  preferable  to  maximize
participation at the local level where possible. For larger scale public investments, democratic control
would likely be of a representative (as opposed to a directly participatory) kind.  
3.3.9 Summary
The main theoretical differences between market socialists and non-market socialists is between the
degree to which capitalism is defined by the market itself and by extension the degree to which basic
needs are provided free of charge and not on the basis of monetary exchange.  Non-market socialists
argue that the market has a logic of its own, independent of the private ownership of the means of
production.   Market  socialists  suggest  that  markets  can  be  embedded  within  collective  plans,
regulations,  and democratic  processes that can shape investment decisions that the market itself  is
incapable of providing.  
56
Market socialists (or market socializers) call for tiered ownership structures depending on the size of
the economic unit, publicly provided markets with certain criteria for entry (especially around open
access to information on costs, mark-ups, and production techniques), free public provision of certain
goods (education, healthcare, access to information networks, finance), consumer-producer feedback
loops, a basic income, minimum/maximum incomes, inheritance taxes, social control of investment
decisions, regulations that establish the ground rules for production units, and some measure of central
planning  to  guide  overall  economic  development.   Essentially,  they  suggest  that  the  coordinating
benefits  of  the  market  can be separated  from private  property,  a  market  in  labour,  and ecological
externalities.  
Non-market  socialists  (or  just  socialists?)  call  for  the  production  of  basic  needs  through  the
democratic  coordination  of  various  economic  sectors  on  the  basis  of  planned  levels  of  output.
Production for need, not for exchange.  This could be accomplished through the nesting of various
levels of worker councils in each industry and through the interaction of worker and consumer groups
around quantity and quality of output.  While I do think this is in principle achievable, I do question the
underlying  premise  that  the  market  abstracted  from  power  and  private  property  is  inherently
antagonistic to democratic control.  I think the market socialists present a compelling case that the
market  can  be  molded  in  various  ways  to  ensure  economic  security,  foster  democratic  control  of
investment,  and halt  the cycle  of endless accumulation.   Contrary to  McNally I  think that  private
ownership is one of the defining feature of capitalist economy and that the tendency to accumulate
cannot be divorced from it (or reduced to it).  As Moore has argued, the tendency for capitalism to
accumulate  is  a multifaceted phenomenon that  is  rooted in private  property,  perceptions  of nature,
imperial projects, and cultural developments.  Evidently, the capitalist market has been part and parcel
of this historical process.  However, this does not imply, I don’t think, that markets cannot be subjected
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to  democratic control  or can exhibit  inevitable tendencies,  since it  all  depends on the context  and
structure of markets (which predate capitalism).  If democratic control can be exerted over planning
and investment then markets need not express any inevitable tendencies towards accumulation.  Indeed,
if the scale of economic processes can become a democratic concern then so can accumulation, since
any measures to reduce the amount of energy and material throughput (to lower environmental impact)
will impose limits on accumulation.  
However, the uniqueness of capitalist markets revolves around their incorporation of land and labour,
two things that historically were not exchanged for money.  Along with land goes the market in fossil
fuels, which, as we know now, should not be burned at any price.  The question is, if these things are
once again taken out of the sphere of market exchange, what is left for the market to allocate?  If, as
McNally says, the price of human labour is not set by the market then how can any other prices be set
by the  market  without  the market  setting the  price  on such an essential  input  into the  production
process?  Market socialists would respond that labour should only be partially taken out of the market,
subject to guaranteed wages within definite lower and upper bounds.  This would negatively effect
“efficient” market allocation but should be considered a necessary sacrifice for ensuring the health and
well-being of all members of society.  
Every market transaction requires a reduction to a certain quantity of money.  If that reduction does
not serve to undermine the long-term sustainability of living ecosystems (including human beings),
then it could be considered a tolerable one.  Currently, the entire economic system is based on the
exchange of fossil fuels,  which should be left  in the ground in order to avoid catastrophic climate
change.  Obviously,  this  reduction cannot be tolerated,  but it  also cannot be simply stopped.  The
weight of past practices makes changing course a more protracted affair.  Restricting and removing
land  and  labour  from  market  reductionism must  be  a  process  that  moves  hand-in-hand  with  the
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technological  reorientation  of  society towards  one  that  exists  within  the  regenerative  capacities  of
Earth's ecosystems.  In this sense, I will argue that the reforms proposed by the market socialists and
Economic Democracy proponents are a step in the right direction,  in that they allow for a certain
reclaiming of democratic sovereignty over market reductionism and anarchy; including the withering
away of the market itself as sustainability is attempted.  
While the institutional reforms advanced by market socialists and Economic Democracy proponents
are not entirely consistent, it is certainly possible to identify the commonalities and understand the
principles  on which  the  economy can be democratized.   Specifically,  democracy can  be  extended
within  workplaces  through  co-operative  ownership  structures;  and over  the  future  structure  of  the
economy through  citizen  participation  in  the  distribution  of  credit,  citizen  participation  in  public
investment,  constructing  links  between  producer  and  consumer  groups  (and  planners),  and  some
measure  of  representative  central  planning.   The  free  and  equal  access  to  information  that  Elson
proposed I find to be a particularly promising direction of reform and prescient of the free software
movement.  The “free” in free software does not represent distribution without a price but rather that
“the users have the freedom to run, copy, distribute, study, change and improve the software” (“What is
free software?,” n.d.)  This is freedom in the sense of autonomy: where users control the software
instead of vice versa.  Especially in a period when technological transition is imperative, barriers to the
free proliferation of ideas and designs could slow the adoption of alternative technologies.  But more
than this the private property in knowledge (as a subcategory of private property generally) has been a
key way that technology and power have been concentrated within the history of capitalism (between
countries, between competing firms, or between workers and owners).  Instigating a co-operative ethos
within society as a whole (and between societies in a global sense) would seem to imply equal access to
the cumulative social knowledge that humanity has produced.  How can co-operation be fostered when
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knowledge is jealously guarded (and institutionally protected) to advance the interests of particular
groups or individuals?
4. Degrowth and Democratization
The paper has proceeded from degrowth to economic democracy.  Yet, both sets of literature relate to
the other through the inter-relation of collective choice in the direction of lower material and energy
throughput.  The  degrowth  literature  is  particularly  concerned  with  making  a  degrowth  transition
“socially sustainable” and by that it is meant that the transition must maintain a certain level of security
for everyone (especially those who have jobs in sectors that must be downsized).  It is interesting but
perhaps not surprising, that many of the reforms suggested to accomplish this are similar to what is
articulated  from  a  perspective  of  Economic  Democracy:  reducing  inequality  (through
minimum/maximum  incomes  and  inheritance  taxes),  moving  from  private  to  collective  property,
guaranteeing employment and a basic income, and taxing / capping resource throughput.  This lends
credence to the idea that degrowth and democratization must be integrated parts of a societal transition.
In  the  first  chapter  degrowth's  historical  development  was  explored  and  it  was  revealed  that
degrowth  is  a  multifaceted  movement  that  originated  within  the  limits  to  growth critique  but  has
expanded beyond these roots into the realm of social system change.  While its philosophical roots (in
G-R's bioeconomics) are somewhat different from ecological economics and the steady-state literature,
the proposals for institutional reform do tend to converge on similar measures.  A discussion of these
measures opened up the question of the market and whether the market can be separated out from the
rest  of capitalism,  even with certain crucial  reforms in place (such as producer  co-operatives,  full
employment, and strong redistribution of wealth).
The  introductory  section  on  capitalism  had  identified  that  markets  were  part  of  the  historical
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development of capitalism, as a tool for reducing and equating previously unexchangeable items: land
and labour.  State-enforced markets, along with colonial exploitation and the labour-capital relation
were pivotal in mobilizing extra-human nature in service to rising labour productivity.   The second
chapter of the paper explored the debate over markets in the socialist tradition.  For the most part, the
debate ignored this historical role of markets in the development of capitalism and the metabolic rift.
Elson had the insight that markets are not costless, ready-made institutions, but she does not consider
the  implications  of  market  reductionism  on  the  historical  trajectory  of  capitalist  society  and  the
ecological crisis we now confront.  McNally argued that the market in human labour is the crucial
defining  feature  of  capitalism  and  that  the  market  institution  is  not  compatible  with  labour's
decommodification.   While ultimately,  I agree with McNally that the market cannot be harmlessly
retained in a post-capitalist  society,  I think this process of decommodification can only proceed in
partial steps, and that it must be accompanied by a transition in the relationship between human beings
and the rest of nature.  The market is such an embedded institution, not only within the culture of the
Global North, but also within the metabolism of humans and nature, that it can only be restricted in
tandem with other changes in that metabolism.  
So while it is argued that the market should diminish in importance as an ecologically sustainable
human civilization is attempted,  in the here and now, it  must be treated as an element of existing
technological infrastructure that must be somewhat gradually and partially reduced, and restricted. This
should  entail  measures  to  socialize  the  market  and  democratize  it,  along  the  lines  of  Elson  and
Malleson.  Specifically, the market could be publicly constituted with conditions for entry that ensure
the transparency of mark-ups and production methods.  Producer and consumer groups could be set up
to deliberate over product design and best practices, with this information feeding into larger plans. Co-
operatively owned and operated production units could receive credit from publicly owned and locally
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controlled banks.  Strong measures of redistribution could ensure that the market adequately represents
the  population's  preferences.   Full  employment  policies  and  a  guaranteed  income  would  partially
decommodify  labour.   Capital  controls  could  prevent  the  undermining  of  national  sovereignty  by
international finance.  The result would be to set up the institutions through which the market can be
constrained by qualitative, deliberative, and collective decisions.  
Smith (2015) I think is right to suggest that major fossil fuel industries should be nationalized and
slowly shut down according to a plan.  The fossil fuels could even be rationed.  But this does not
require, I think, getting rid of markets whole cloth in this present moment.  Smith (2015) writes that all
market attempts to combat climate change (such as carbon taxes or cap-and-trade) are doomed to fail.
However, this is less a problem of markets per se and rather a problem of fossil fuels being so central to
accumulation and to society in the Global North.  Cap-and-trade schemes have proven successful in the
case of acid rain where the ability to shift production methods was relatively easy and did not threaten
profits to any considerable degree.  The recent failures of the European Union fossil fuel cap-and-trade
scheme says less about the merits of market approaches and more about cap-and-trade schemes that
included serious loopholes (like the Clean Development Mechanism) and ceded too easily to corporate
lobbying for more permits in the midst of a recession (Böhm, 2013).  There is the need for a movement
that  can  challenge  both  corporate  power  and  continual  accumulation,  which  is  incompatible  with
lowering fossil fuel use to any considerable extent.  This would have to be a degrowth movement in
some capacity since the decline of fossil fuels (barring perhaps a nuclear renaissance33) would spell the
end of economic growth.  The state would have to take on an explicit no-growth or degrowth project
rather than its illusory ambitions of “green growth” whose contradictory logic frustrates any attempt to
impose restrictions on fossil fuels because accumulation is assumed to continue.  
33 Nuclear power is still non-renewable and is usually quite controversial due to the dangerous and long-lived waste that is
generated.
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Socializing  the  means  of  production  through  the  proliferation  of  co-operative  and  state-owned
enterprise must be a key part of the transition.  However, once the means of production have been
socialized the problem of individual, collective, public, and global interests, present and future, must
still be resolved. This will entail its own social conflicts but at least there will not be a class of people
who can profit  from the continuation of the status quo, prevent  action on reducing fossil  fuel use
through their powerful position in the economy, and insulate themselves from most negative effects of
environmental destruction and social unrest.  Of course, nationalization does not ensure that the state
will  be  willing  or  able  to  act  in  the  long-term interest  of  ecological  sustainability.   Many Latin
American countries have nationalized their extractive industries but continue to extract resources in
order to fund their social programs (Gudynas, 2010). This extraction often proceeds against the protests
of indigenous people and environmentalists.  While reforming the democratic structure of the state
would  not  remove  these  conflicts,  it  could  promote  greater  accountability  to  the  people  who  are
ultimately served by it.  While the focus in this paper has been on democratizing the economy34, clearly
the administration of the state itself could be further democratized as well.  The limit of democratic
participation to a vote every four years is quite clear.  Malleson has suggested participatory budgeting
as a way to bring ordinary citizens into the local budget decisions that will affect them most directly.
Other avenues could include what Panitch (1993, pp. 10–12) has suggested: overcoming the division
between  administration  and  representation,  promoting  full  public  disclosure  of  information  and
encouragement of debate, and fostering an active citizenry.  Or the citizen environmental regulatory
councils that Seccombe proposes  (1993).  In addition, the work of Eckersley (2004) has shown how
democracy can be enhanced to include consideration of future generations and other species (what she
calls “ecological democracy”).  
34 While recognizing that there is no clean distinction between “government” and “economy” but rather a differentiation 
of functions that has proceeded in tandem with capitalist development.  
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Practically, the reduction of fossil fuel use must go hand in hand with investments in reducing fossil
fuel dependency, and sequestering the carbon dioxide that has already been emitted in order to prevent
runaway climate change.  The program of reducing fossil fuel dependency should start with those areas
essential  to  human survival  (such as  food and shelter).  Fortunately,  there  is  a  lot  of  potential  for
sequestering carbon in the soil (in the form of biochar) so reversing climate change could be part of re-
establishing  a  non-fossil  based agriculture  (see  Matovic,  2011).   There  is  a  substantial  worldwide
movement that is simultaneously challenging corporate control over the food sector but also attempting
to  re-establish  sustainable  methods  of  food  production.   This  movement  collapses  the  discrete
distinctions  between  private  ownership,  technological  change,  and  democracy,  since  the  move  to
transform  the  technological  basis  of  agriculture  is  simultaneously  a  move  to  transform  property
relations and simultaneously a move to take back control over food production.  
The investments in renewable energy and materials along with the divestment from fossil fuels will
result in a reconfiguration of the division of labour and the lowering of labour productivity.  Many
people will lose their traditional jobs and be looking for work.  An essential part of the technological
transition will be the retraining of the labour force into those jobs that help lower societal dependence
on fossil fuels.  In terms of funding these investments, the revenue from carbon taxes or carbon caps
could be used (an idea which recognizes that fossil fuel energy cannot simply be stopped but must be
used to reconstruct the organization of production, consumption, living patterns, and land use along
sustainable lines).  
I have already shown that caps are better than taxes from an ecological standpoint, however it is hard
to say what will  gain the most political  traction since “cap and trade” seems to have been largely
discredited by the European experience while the “carbon fee and dividend”35 seems to be much more
35 Again, I focus on fossil fuels but the logic could apply to any resource.  A fee and dividend scheme returns any 
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popular among environmental activists (although that is my own anecdotal experience).  Unfortunately,
the efficacy of the fee and dividend approach is questionable since the money is not necessarily being
spent  on  making  investments  to  lower  fossil  fuel  dependency.   There  would  be  an  incentive  for
producers to lower the carbon intensity of their  products however the incentive still  plays into the
individual  preference  aggregating  logic  of  the  market  and  the  dividend  could  fuel  increased
consumption (even if oriented towards greener products).  Instead, the tax revenue could be explicitly
geared to provide support to implement different scales of sustainable infrastructure (i.e., that which
lowers energy dependency to levels which can be provided by renewable energy).  Government could
distribute the taxed money to a combination of individuals, neighbourhood councils, communities, or
municipalities for explicit construction of alternative energy projects, urban/regional agriculture, public
transportation, or energy efficiency improvement projects (e.g., housing retrofits) which would I think
more effectively accelerate the transition to a low-carbon economy.  There is even evidence that people
in the United States prefer that carbon tax revenues be used to fund research and development of
renewable energy technology (see Amdur, Rabe, & Borick, 2014).  This funding could form the seeds
of the public community banks that Malleson describes.  The Canadian Union of Postal Workers and
the authors of the Leap Manifesto have called for the transformation of the nationally owned post office
network into hubs for community banking, renewable energy financing, local food distribution centres,
etc.  (“Delivering Community Power,” 2016).    There is an opportunity to use the revenue generated
from a carbon tax to facilitate a democratic process towards the investment of that revenue in lowering
fossil fuel dependence.  
generated tax revenue back to the population via an equal dividend.  
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5. Conclusion
Capitalism is  an  extremely  durable  and  flexible  system but  it  is  not  inevitable.   Its  substantial
momentum is less and less all the time as the ecological contradictions, that are integral to its existence,
intensify.  Unfortunately, capitalism is a world-ecological system that threatens the basis on which all
of humanity exists.  In writing this paper I have sought to show that capitalism can be transformed into
something  that  is  not  capitalism.   Sometimes  the  use  of  “capitalism”  in  discussion  can  serve  to
minimize agency and prevent the adoption of transition measures because they will  not overthrow
capitalism in one fell swoop.  In contrast, I have sought to show that overthrowing capitalism must be
about a process of restoring a sustainable relationship with the Earth; not something that can be easily
accomplished or quickly done (although time is of the essence).  This is simultaneously a process of
transforming private property and private control (particularly that embodied in  large monopolistic
corporations).   There  are  significant  structural  barriers  towards  reforming  the  existing  system:  a
preoccupation with economic growth (on the part of many, not just elites), class power structures that
can obstruct change, a division of labour that concentrates technical capacity and deprives people of
individual  and collective  autonomy,  the  gap between democratic  governance  and global  economic
activity, the dependence of society on fossil fuels, and the private control of information and media, etc.
Nevertheless, the ideological foundations of capitalism are more and more being called into question.
The reforms to be fought for must be those that undermine the dynamics that have contributed to the
present state of the world economy.  This includes private property, markets, imperialism, concentration
of technological capacity, inequality, and accumulation itself.  What I have tried to contribute in this
paper has been reforms worth fighting for at  a large scale,  how to theorize the market within this
transition,  some  feeling  for  the  inter-connectedness  of  different  transitional  elements,  and  how
democracy and degrowth inter-relate or could inter-relate.  
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While I have tended to focus on the issue of climate change and the need to transition our energy
systems away from fossil  fuels, this transition must inevitably involve changing the whole system;
from one of accumulation, to one of regeneration.  Or as Naomi Klein (2014) has put it: from extraction
to renewal.  
Klein's book has spawned a coalition of Canadian organizations and activists who have put forward
the radical proposal for a “leap” to a different economy (“A call for a Canada based on caring for the
Earth and one another”).  This is part of the broader climate justice movement.   Another part of this
movement is the joint Canadian and US coalition of eco-socialists called “System Change Not Climate
Change”, united in their belief that capitalism is driving climate change.  They believe the climate
justice movement will unite with the labour movement to create an alternative system to that shaped by
fossil fuels and corporate power.  
The labour movement must be a key ally but in the sense that Gorz has described:  “the widening of
the union's sphere of activity and the working out of an overall political-ideological concept can not be
simply a reaction to the increased rigidity of the capitalist system, but must offer a common ground for
action to a highly differentiated class of manual, technical and intellectual workers.  For their unity in
action can never be obtained by adding up the immediate interests of their respective trades, but only
through an overall vision transcending these interests”  (André Gorz, 1980, p. 135).  It would appear
that labour unions must adopt a strategy of worker control in the recognition that capitalist private
property and the endless pursuit of capital accumulation is a vehicle for both the exploitation of labour
and nature.  There are some examples of unions taking on an explicit degrowth position in France and
Spain  (Bayon, 2014) and the working class has long been engaged in a struggle to reduce working
time.
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Another  promising  avenue  for  political  action  is  in  the  reconstitution  of  an  organic  agriculture
system,  and  as  a  result,  a  reciprocal  relationship  with  the  land.   As  Moore  notes:  “[F]ood  and
agriculture has become a decisive battleground of the world class struggle.  It is no longer largely a
struggle of peasant against landlords.  Food security, safety, and sustainability have become central
questions in the everyday lives of the world proletariat, from Beijing to Boston” (2015, p. 288).  This
movement has not taken hold as powerfully in the Global North as in the Global South (due to the
different divisions of labour) but it offers a powerful ground for challenging the industrial fossil-based
model  of  food  production,  the  metabolic  rift,  and  capitalism itself.   Within  Canada  the  National
Farmer’s Union is a founding member of La Via Campesina, a global movement “that brings together
organizations  representing  small-  and  medium-scale  farmers,  peasants,  agricultural  workers,  rural
women, and indigenous communities.  It  is pluralistic,  democratic,  multi-cultural,  and non-partisan”
(“NFU and La Via Campesina,” n.d.).  
Hopefully, these movements can coalesce into a sufficient political force capable of achieving the
necessary system change that is so desperately needed.  
68
6. References
Alcott, B. (2013). Should degrowth embrace the Job Guarantee? Journal of Cleaner Production, 38, 
56–60. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2011.06.007
Alexander, S. (2012). Planned economic contraction: the emerging case for degrowth. Environmental 
Politics, 21(3), 349–368. http://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2012.671569
Alexander, S. (2014). Basic and Maximum Income. In Degrowth: A Vocabulary for a New Era. 
Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge.
Amdur, D., Rabe, B. G., & Borick, C. P. (2014). Public views on a carbon tax depend on the proposed 
use of revenue. Available at SSRN. Retrieved from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2652403
Auerbach, P., Desai, M., & Shamsavari, A. (1988). The Transition from Actually Existing Capitalism. 
New Left Review, (170), 61–78.
Bayon, D. (2014). Unions. In Degrowth: A Vocabulary for a New Era. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, 
NY: Routledge.
Blackburn, R. (1991). Fin de Siecle: Socialism after the Crash. New Left Review, (185), 5–66.
Blauwhof, F. B. (2012). Overcoming accumulation: Is a capitalist steady-state economy possible? 
Ecological Economics, 84, 254–261. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2012.03.012
Böhm, S. (2013, April 12). Why are carbon markets failing? The Guardian. Retrieved from 
http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/blog/why-are-carbon-markets-failing
Bonaiuti, M. (Ed.). (2011). From Bioeconomics to Degrowth: Georgescu-Roegen’s “New Economics” 
in Eight Essays. Routledge.
Boyd, D. R. (2015). Cleaner, Greener, Healthier: A Prescription for Stronger Canadian Environmental 
Policies. Vancouver, BC: UBC Press.
Bromley, D. W. (1991). Environment and Economy: Property Rights and Public Policy. Oxford, UK ; 
Cambridge, USA: Blackwell Pub.
Brundtland, G. H., & others. (1987). Our Common Future: Report of the World Commission on 
Environment and Development.
Cutillas, S., Llistar, D., & Tarafa, G. (2014). Debt Audit. In Degrowth: A Vocabulary for a New Era. 
Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge.
D’Alisa, G., Demaria, F., & Kallis, G. (Eds.). (2014). Degrowth: A Vocabulary for a New Era. 
Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge.
Delivering Community Power: Launching a bold vision for the green transformation of the post office. 
(2016, February 25). Retrieved May 6, 2016, from http://www.cupw.ca/en/delivering-
community-power-launching-bold-vision-green-transformation-post-office
Demaria, F., Schneider, F., Sekulova, F., & Martinez-Alier, J. (2013). What is Degrowth? From an 
Activist Slogan to a Social Movement. Environmental Values, 22(2), 191–215. 
69
http://doi.org/10.3197/096327113X13581561725194
Deriu, M. (2014). Conviviality. In Degrowth: A Vocabulary for a New Era. Abingdon, Oxon ; New 
York, NY: Routledge.
Domènech, L., March, H., & Saurí, D. (2013). Degrowth initiatives in the urban water sector? A social 
multi-criteria evaluation of non-conventional water alternatives in Metropolitan Barcelona. 
Journal of Cleaner Production, 38, 44–55. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2011.09.020
Eckersley, R. (2004). The Green State: Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Elson, D. (1988). Market Socialism or Socialization of the Market? New Left Review, (172), 3–44.
Elson, D. (2000). Socialized Markets, not Market Socialism. Socialist Register, 36(36). Retrieved from 
http://socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/article/view/5735
Foster, J. B. (2000). Marx’s Ecology: Materialism and Nature.
Foster, J. B. (2011, January 1). Capitalism and Degrowth: An Impossibility Theorem. Retrieved from 
http://monthlyreview.org/2011/01/01/capitalism-and-degrowth-an-impossibility-theorem/
Foster, J. B., Clark, B., & York, R. (2010). The Ecological Rift: Capitalism’s War on the Earth.
Georgescu-Roegen, N. (2011a). Energy and economic myths. In M. Bonaiuti (Ed.), From 
Bioeconomics to Degrowth: Georgescu-Roegen’s “New Economics” in Eight Essays. 
Routledge.
Georgescu-Roegen, N. (2011b). The Entropy Law and the economic problem (1970). In M. Bonaiuti 
(Ed.), From Bioeconomics to Degrowth: Georgescu-Roegen’s “New Economics” in Eight 
Essays. Routledge.
Goldenberg, S., Vidal, J., Taylor, L., Vaughan, A., & Harvey, F. (2015, December 12). Paris climate 
deal: nearly 200 nations sign in end of fossil fuel era. The Guardian. Retrieved from 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/dec/12/paris-climate-deal-200-nations-sign-
finish-fossil-fuel-era
Goldman, E. (1916). The Social Aspects of Birth Control.
Gorz, A. (1968). Strategy for Labor: A Radical Proposal (First Printing edition). Boston: Beacon Press.
Gorz, A. (1980). Ecology as Politics. (P. Vigderman & J. Cloud, Trans.). Black Rose Books Ltd.
Gudynas, E. (2010). The new extractivism of the 21st century: ten urgent theses about extractivism in 
relation to current South American progressivism. Americas Program.
Harvey, D. (1997). Dialectics. In Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference. Wiley.
Harvey, D. (2007). In What Ways Is’ The New Imperialism’Really New? Historical Materialism, 
15(3), 57–70.
Heede, R. (2013). Tracing anthropogenic carbon dioxide and methane emissions to fossil fuel and 
cement producers, 1854–2010. Climatic Change, 122(1-2), 229–241. 
http://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-013-0986-y
Heller, H. (2011). The Birth of Capitalism: A 21st Century Perspective (1st Printing edition). London : 
70
Halifax : New York: Pluto Press.
Illich, I. (2001). Tools for Conviviality. London: Marion Boyars.
Israel, S. (2016, March 9). Basic income: New life for an old idea. Retrieved May 6, 2016, from 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/basic-income-interest-1.3479079
Jackson, T. (2014). New Economy. In Degrowth: A Vocabulary for a New Era. Abingdon, Oxon ; New 
York, NY: Routledge.
Jackson, T., & Victor, P. (2011). Productivity and work in the “green economy”: Some theoretical 
reflections and empirical tests. Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions, 1(1), 101–
108. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2011.04.005
Jackson, T., & Victor, P. A. (2015). Does credit create a “growth imperative”? A quasi-stationary 
economy with interest-bearing debt. Ecological Economics, 120(C), 32–48.
Johanisova, N., Crabtree, T., & Fraňková, E. (2013). Social enterprises and non-market capitals: a path 
to degrowth? Journal of Cleaner Production, 38, 7–16. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2012.01.004
Johanisova, N., Padilla, R. S., & Parry Philippa. (2014). Co-operatives. In Degrowth: A Vocabulary for 
a New Era. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge.
Kallis, G. (2015, November 5). The Left should embrace degrowth. New Internationalist. Retrieved 
from http://newint.org/features/web-exclusive/2015/11/05/left-degrowth/
Kallis, G., Kerschner, C., & Martinez-Alier, J. (2012). The economics of degrowth. Ecological 
Economics, 84, 172–180. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2012.08.017
Kerschner, C. (2010). Economic de-growth vs. steady-state economy. Journal of Cleaner Production, 
18(6), 544–551. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2009.10.019
Klein, N. (2014). This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. the Climate. Knopf Canada.
Klitgaard, K. A., & Krall, L. (2012). Ecological economics, degrowth, and institutional change. 
Ecological Economics, 84, 247–253. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2011.11.008
Levins, R., & Lewontin, R. (1987). The Dialectical Biologist (1 edition). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press.
Lowy, M. (2009, October 10). A systematic biography of Ernest Mandel. International Viewpoint.
Malleson, T. (2014). After Occupy: Economic Democracy for the 21st Century. Oxford University 
Press.
Malm, A. (2013). The Origins of Fossil Capital: From Water to Steam in the British Cotton Industry. 
Historical Materialism, 21(1), 15–68.
Mandel, E. (1986). In Defence of Socialist Planning. New Left Review. Retrieved from 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/mandel/1986/09/planning.html
Marchese, R. (2015, November 1). It’s not too late to nix disastrous Hydro One sell-off. Retrieved May
6, 2016, from https://www.thestar.com/opinion/commentary/2015/11/01/its-not-too-late-to-nix-
disastrous-hydro-one-sell-off.html
71
Marglin, S. (1974). What Do Bosses Do? The origins and functions of hierarchy in capitalist 
production, Part I. The Review of Radical Political Economics, 6(2), 60–112.
Martinez-Alier, J. (2009). Socially Sustainable Economic De-growth. Development and Change, 40(6),
1099–1119.
Martinez-Alier, J. (2014). Neo-Malthusians. In Degrowth: A Vocabulary for a New Era. Abingdon, 
Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge.
Martínez-Alier, J., Pascual, U., Vivien, F.-D., & Zaccai, E. (2010). Sustainable de-growth: Mapping the
context, criticisms and future prospects of an emergent paradigm. Ecological Economics, 69(9),
1741–1747.
Marx, K. (1999). Capital Volume I: A Critique of Political Economy. Marx/Engels Internet Archive 
(marxists.org). Retrieved from https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/
Matovic, D. (2011). Biochar as a viable carbon sequestration option: Global and Canadian perspective. 
Energy, 36(4), 2011–2016. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2010.09.031
McNally, D. (1993). Against the Market: Political Economy, Market Socialism and the Marxist 
Critique. London: Verso.
Mellor, M. (2014). Money, Public. In Degrowth: A Vocabulary for a New Era. Abingdon, Oxon ; New 
York, NY: Routledge.
Meszaros, I. (2014). The Necessity of Social Control. NYU Press.
Moore, J. W. (2000). Environmental Crises and the Metabolic Rift in World-Historical Perspective. 
Organization & Environment, 13(2), 123–157. http://doi.org/10.1177/1086026600132001
Moore, J. W. (2003). “The Modern World-System” as Environmental History? Ecology and the Rise of 
Capitalism. Theory and Society, 32(3), 307–377.
Moore, J. W. (2014). The Capitalocene Part II: Abstract Social Nature and the Limits to Capital. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.jasonwmoore.com/uploads/The_Capitalocene___Part_II__June_2014.pdf
Moore, J. W. (2015). Capitalism in the Web of Life: Ecology and the Accumulation of Capital. Verso.
NFU and La Via Campesina. (n.d.). Retrieved May 6, 2016, from http://www.nfu.ca/about/nfu-and-la-
campesina
Panitch, L. (1993). A Different Kind of State? In A Different Kind of State?: Popular Power and 
Democratic Administration. Toronto: Oxford University Press Canada.
Panitch, L., & Gindin, S. (2013). The Making of Global Capitalism. Verso.
Pickett, K., & Wilkinson, R. (2010). The Spirit Level: Why Greater Equality Makes Societies Stronger. 
London: Penguin.
Polanyi, K. (2001). The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (1 
edition). Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
Sarkar, S. (1999). Eco-Socialism or Eco-Capitalism?: A Critical Analysis of Humanity’s Fundamental 
Choices. London ; New York: Zed Books.
72
Schneider, F., Kallis, G., & Martinez-Alier, J. (2010). Crisis or opportunity? Economic degrowth for 
social equity and ecological sustainability. Introduction to this special issue. Journal of Cleaner 
Production, 18(6), 511–518. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2010.01.014
Schor, J. B. (2014). Work Sharing. In Degrowth: A Vocabulary for a New Era. Abingdon, Oxon ; New 
York, NY: Routledge.
Schumacher, E. F. (1989). Small Is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered. New York: Harper 
Perennial.
Schweickart, D. (1996). Against Capitalism (Paperback Original edition). Boulder, Colo: Westview 
Press.
Seccombe, W. (1993). Democracy and Ecology: Envisioning a Transition to a Green Economy. In A 
Different Kind of State?: Popular Power and Democratic Administration. Toronto: Oxford 
University Press Canada.
Sekulova, F., Kallis, G., Rodríguez-Labajos, B., & Schneider, F. (2013). Degrowth: from theory to 
practice. Journal of Cleaner Production, 38, 1–6.
Smith, R. (2015). Green Capitalism: The God that Failed.
Steffen, W., Broadgate, W., Deutsch, L., Gaffney, O., & Ludwig, C. (2015). The trajectory of the 
Anthropocene: the great acceleration. The Anthropocene Review, 2(1), 81–98.
Unti, N. (2014). Job Guarantee. In Degrowth: A Vocabulary for a New Era. Abingdon, Oxon ; New 
York, NY: Routledge.
Victor, P. A. (2008). Managing Without Growth: Slower by Design, Not Disaster. Cheltenham, UK ; 
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Pub.
Wallerstein, I. (2007). The Ecology and the Economy: What is Rational? In A. Hornborg, J. R. 
McNeill, & J. M. Alier (Eds.), Rethinking Environmental History: World-system History and 
Global Environmental Change. Rowman Altamira.
What is free software? (n.d.). Retrieved May 6, 2016, from https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-
sw.html
Wood, E. M. (1995). Democracy against Capitalism: Renewing Historical Materialism. Cambridge ; 
New York: Cambridge University Press.
73
